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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

TIMING OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE LEGISLATURES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF CONTRIBUTORS

There is a great deal of work on campaign finance at the national level, however,
state level research is sparse. My dissertation fills this void in the literature by examining
the motivations of contributors to state legislators. The literature discusses two major
motivations of contributors – universalistic contributors, who hope to influence election
outcomes, and particularistic contributors who hope to influence legislative votes. The
primary hypothesis is that proximity to the general election is the primary factor in
explaining contribution patterns in state legislatures; however, proximity to a legislative
vote of interest to the contributor will also be significant in explaining contribution
patterns. Additionally, the dissertation examines the impact of session limits on
contribution patterns.
I use campaign contribution data collected by the National Institute on Money in
State Politics and select twenty-five bills in nine states to test the primary hypothesis. I
use a contributor fixed effects model to test for increased or decreased levels of
contributions for each contributor, given the proximity to the election and legislative
votes important to the contributor.
The results indicate that contributions increase across all states in the two months
prior to the general and primary elections, and that proximity to the election is the most
important factor in explaining campaign contributions in state legislatures. In 32% of all
cases in the study, there was direct evidence of interest groups attempting to influence the

outcome of legislative votes. Additionally, an increase in contributions close to a major
legislative vote occurred in 77% of the cases without session limits, indicating that
interest groups are highly active in attempting to influence policy outcomes. An
additional examination of contribution patterns indicates that PACs shift their
contributions to the beginning of the legislative session when faced with session limits.
My research contributes to our understanding of the motives of campaign contributors
and their actions when faced with legal restrictions on their contributions. This research,
therefore, allows campaign finance reformers to make better reform decisions.
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Action Committees, Interest Groups

David W. Prince
September 21, 2006

TIMING OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE LEGISLATURES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF CONTRIBUTORS

By
David W. Prince

Donald A. Gross
Director of Dissertation
Donald A. Gross
Director of Graduate Studies
September 21, 2006
Date

RULES FOR USE OF DISSERTATIONS
Unpublished dissertations submitted for the Doctor's degree and deposited in the
University of Kentucky Library are as a rule open for inspection, but are to be used only
with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but
quotations or summaries of parts may be published only with the permission of the
author, and with the usual scholarly acknowledgments.
Extensive copying or publication of the dissertation in whole or in part also requires the
consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Kentucky.
A library that borrows this dissertation for use by its patrons is expected to secure
the signature of each user.
Name

Date

DISSERTATION

David W. Prince

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
2006

TIMING OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE LEGISLATURES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF CONTRIBUTORS

______________________________________
DISSERTATION
______________________________________

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By
David W. Prince
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Donald A. Gross, Professor of Political Science
Lexington, Kentucky
2006
Copyright ©David W. Prince 2006

DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Kimberly Sykes-Prince.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of a project such as this would be impossible without the
assistance of many wonderful individuals along the way. First, I would like to thank my
committee chair Dr. Donald Gross for his assistance and patience in completing this
project. In particular, I want to think him for providing me a great deal of lead-way in the
direction of this project, but always offering advice when I needed it to help get me back
on track. Second, I want to thank Dr. Richard Fording who has not only provided me
with important advice in the completion of this project as a committee member, but has
also provided me with encouragement at times when I thought this project may never be
completed. Third, I want to thank Dr. D. Stephen Voss who always challenges me to get
more out of my abilities than I often believe are possible. This final product is much
better due to his insightful comments. Forth, I want to thank Dr. Eugenia Toma for
serving on my committee. Her enthusiasm for students and for teaching serves as an
inspiration in my on teaching endeavors.
In addition to my committee, there are many other individuals to thank. I would
like to thank Dr. William Cassie at Appalachian State University for providing me with
the inspiration to pursue study in the field of state politics. I would also like to thank Dr.
Ruth Ann Strickland of Appalachian State University for giving me the opportunity to
teach for the first time.
I would like to thank the entire faculty at the University of Kentucky for their
encouragement and support throughout my studies. Furthermore, I would like to thank all
of the graduate students I have had the honor to study with for your support and
encouragement and for challenging me to be my best.

iii

I would like to thank Dr. Margaret Mahoney and the entire department of History
and Political Science at Bellarmine University for their support and encouragement
during this process. I also want to thank Dr. Mahoney for believing in me enough to give
me my first full time teaching job. The experience I have gained at Bellarmine has proven
to be invaluable as I begin my teaching career. Furthermore, I would like to thank those
students I have had at Bellarmine that offered words of encouragement and challenged
my own thinking during this process.
Additionally, I want to thank Dr. Keith Hamm of Rice University whose
comments at a meeting of the American Political Science Association were a key
component to understanding some of the findings in this dissertation. Furthermore, I want
to thank all the panelist, discussants and audience members that offered helpful
comments at the various conferences were versions of this research was presented. Their
comments and suggestions resulted in a much better final product.
Finally, I want to thank all my friends and family who supported me throughout
this project, even when they had serious doubts about its completion. I especially want to
thank my parents for their love and support and my wife Kimberly who always believes
in me and whose support never falters.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………..iii
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………..vii
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………..ix
List of Files……………………………………………………………………………..xi
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………1
Chapter 2: The History of Campaign Finance Reforms………………………………12
1. Campaign Finance at the Federal Level…………………………………...13
2. State Campaign Finance Reform………………………………………......20
3. Campaign Finance Laws in the Nine States Sample………………………22
3.1. Illinois……………………………………………………..............23
3.2. New Mexico……………………………………………………….24
3.3. Utah…………………………………………………………….....24
3.4. California…………………………………………………….........24
3.5. New York………………………………………………………....25
3.6. South Carolina………………………………………………….....26
3.7. Kentucky………………………………………………………….26
3.8. Georgia……………………………………………………………27
3.9. Wisconsin…………………………………………………………27
3.10. Summary of Nine State Sample………………………………....28
4. Summary of campaign finance laws………………………………………. 29
Chapter 3: Literature Review…………………………………………………………44
1. Factors that affect spending……………………………………………….46
2. Literature indicating the effects of spending upon
electoral developments……………………………………………………48
2.1. Outcomes…………………………………………………………48
2.2. Competition………………………………………………………50
2.3. Knowledge and Interest…………………………………………..55
2.4. Turnout…………………………………………………………...56
3. Literature on contributors…………………………………………………..57
3.1. Why do contributors give money?..................................................57
3.2. Who gets money and whom does it benefit?..................................59
4. Contributions and legislative behavior……………………………………...63
5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..65
Chapter 4: Theory and Hypotheses……………………………………………………68
1. Contributions and critical time points……………………………………..70

v

2. Particularistic contributors………………………………………………...74
2.1 Summary of particularistic contributors……………………………… 78
3.
4.
5.
6.

Universalistic contributors…………………………………………………78
Summary of contribution patterns…………………………………………78
Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………80
Conclusion………………………………………………………………….83

Chapter 5: Data and Model of Legislative Contributions……………………………...85
1. Model of campaign contributions…………………………………………..86
2. Contribution data…………………………………………………………...89
3. States selected for this study……………………………………………….90
4. Legislation to be examined…………………………………………………92
5. Conclusion………………………………………………………………….98
Chapter 6: The Pattern of Campaign Contributions………………………………….106
1. The Impact of Elections on Campaign Contributions…………………….107
2. The Impact of Legislative Votes on Contribution Patterns……………….108
2.1. States without Session Limits on Campaign Contributors…………...109
2.2. States with prohibitions on campaign contributions………………….112
3. The Impact of Session Limits on Contribution Patterns……………………113
4. Legislative Session and Contribution Patterns……………………………..114
4.1. Contribution patterns in states with session limits
on contributions……………………………………………………….115
4.2. Contribution patterns in states without session limits
on contributions……………………………………………………….119
5. States which place limits on campaign contributions
during sessions……………………………………………………………...121
6. Legislative Professionalism and Campaign Contributions…………………122
7. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..124
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Discussion………………………………………………163
1. The Effectiveness of Campaign Finance Reform………………………….167
2. Limitations of this Research and the Direction for Future Research……....169
Appendix:
Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws………………………………………...174
References………………………………………………………………………….......179
Vita……………………………………………………………………………………..187

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.0. US House Reelection Rates…………………………………………………32
Table 2.1. Campaign Finance Reforms in the States…………………………………...33
Table 2.2. States without limits on contributions……………………………………….34
Table 2.3. Session limits on contributions………………………………………………35
Table 2.4. Campaign Finance Restrictions……………………………………………...36
Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance………………………37
Table 5.0. Model of Legislative Contributions…………………………………………100
Table 5.1. Legislation Examined……………………………………………………….101
Table 6.0. General and Primary Election Contribution Increases……………………..126
Table 6.1. Contributions Patterns in States without Limits on
Session Contributions……………………………………………………… 127
Table 6.2. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the
California Senate: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model………………………..128
Table 6.3. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the Illinois House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model……………………129
Table 6.4. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the Kentucky House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model…………………130
Table 6.5. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the New York: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model………………………..131
Table 6.6. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the New Mexico Senate: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model……………..132
Table 6.7. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the Utah House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model………………………133
Table 6.8. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the Georgia House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model…………………...134

vii

Table 6.9. Impact of Legislative Activity in States with Contribution
Restrictions during Legislative Sessions……………………………………135
Table 6.10. Average Increase in Campaign Contributions…………………………….136
Table 6.11. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the South Carolina House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model………….137
Table 6.12. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions
in the Wisconsin House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model………………138
Table 6.13. Contribution Increases by Rank of Professionalism………………………139
Table 6.14. Contribution Increases by Rank of Professionalism………………………140
Table 7.0. Summary of Findings………………………………………………………170
Table 7.1. Summary of Findings……………………………………………………….173

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 6.0. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 105 – Health Insurance)………………………………………………141
Figure 6.1. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 238 – Tobacco Tax)…………………………………………………...142
Figure 6.2. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week
(SB 138 – Minimum Wage)………………………………………………..143
Figure 6.3. New Mexico Senate Campaign Contributions by Week
(SB439 – Health Care)……………………………………………………..144
Figure 6.4. New Mexico House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 62 – Employee Protection)……………………………………………145
Figure 6.5. New Mexico House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HJR 8 – Minimum Wage)…………………………………………………146
Figure 6.6. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 1492 - Insurance)……………………………………………………...147
Figure 6.7. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week
(SB 14 – Minimum Wage)…………………………………………………148
Figure 6.8. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 1568 – Natural Gas)…………………………………………………..149
Figure 6.9. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week
(SB 71 – Worker’s Compensation)…………………………………………150
Figure 6.10. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week
(SB 604 – Health Care)……………………………………………………151
Figure 6.11. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week
(AB 2242 – Minimum Wage)……………………………………………..152
Figure 6.12. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 4540 – Minimum Wage)……………………………………………..153
Figure 6.13. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week
(SB 1341 - Insurance)……………………………………………………..154
Figure 6.14. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 2487 – Medical Leave)………………………………………………155

ix

Figure 6.15. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week
(AB 5132 – Minimum Wage)……………………………………………..156
Figure 6.16. New York Senate Campaign Contributions by Week
(AB 11723 – Women’s Health Care)……………………………………...157
Figure 6.17. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week
(AB 11624 – Unemployment Benefits)…………………………………...158
Figure 6.18. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week
(AB 11723 – Women’s Health Care)……………………………………...159
Figure 6.19. South Carolina House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 3142 – Right to Work)……………………………………………….160
Figure 6.20. South Carolina House Campaign Contributions by Week
(HB 3289 – Minimum Wage)……………………………………………..161
Figure 6.21. South Carolina House Contributions by Week
(HB 4583 – Health Insurance Task Force)………………………………..162

x

LIST OF FILES

PrinceDissertation2006.pdf…....................................................................................532KB

xi

Chapter 1: Introduction
Campaign finance is a topic of contemporary importance to the American political
system. Many citizens feel they have no voice in a political system controlled by special
interests with deep pockets. In a CBS/New York Times opinion poll conducted in January
of 2006 63% of respondents stated you could only trust government some of the time.
Furthermore, in a Washington Post ABC News poll conducted in March of 2006 62% of
respondents disapproved of the job of Congress. These polls indicate a public mistrust of
government with many citizens feeling government is corrupt, and does not represent them.
Campaign finance reform is one tool to return trust in government to the people, and thus
have lasting implications for a democratic society. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 many
efforts have been made to reform the campaign finance system, however, as the above polls
indicate more than 60 percent of the public still do not trust government. The high level of
mistrust of government among the public leads to the conclusion that previous reform efforts
have done little to help the image of government among the public. If campaign finance is to
be a tool to bring about higher levels of trust in government among the people then it is
critical that we understand the impact of previous reform efforts. If previous reform efforts
have been successful in removing the undue influence of money from politics then campaign
finance reform is likely to be unsuccessful in bringing about higher levels of trust in
government among the people. However, if we find that campaign finance reforms have not
been successful in removing the undue influence of money in politics then we need to
understand why these reforms have not been successful. It is important to understand the
strategies that interest groups employ when faced with legal restrictions on their contribution
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activities, and therefore offer proposals that may close some of the loopholes in the current
law, and in turn bring about higher levels of trust among the public.
In a speech on September 27, 1999 in Nashua New Hampshire to announce his
candidacy for President, Senator John McCain stated, “If we are to meet the challenges of
our time, we must take the corrupting influence of special interest out of politics.” McCain
has continued to serve as the primary spokesperson for campaign finance reform at the
national level and has been the key actor in the recent passage of campaign finance reform
with its centerpiece of banning soft money.
The McCain-Feingold campaign finance legislation attempts to fill in many of the
existing loopholes that plague campaign finance laws passed in the 1970s. However, despite
the bipartisan support the act received, it still has failed to achieve many of its goals, and has
often left supporters with results that were not as successful in changing the undue influence
of money in politics as supporters had hoped. For example, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan,
a supporter of passage of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform, spoke on the
Senate floor in March 2002 and stated, “The political landscape will change when this bill
takes effect.” Levin continued by stating, “It will be filled with more people and less
influence; more contributors and smaller contributions; more democracy and less elitism.”
Additionally, despite many challenges to the law, which resulted in a 298 page Supreme
Court opinion, many issues remain unresolved1.
Despite the many challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of
2002, as well as previous reform efforts, the courts have consistently supported the
constitutionality of contribution limits. In the landmark Supreme Court case Buckley v.
1

See the 2003 Supreme Court Decision McConnell, United States Senator, Et Al. v. Federal Election
Commission Et Al. [02-1674]
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Valeo in 1976, the court upheld the constitutionality of limitations on contributions to
candidates for federal office. In their ruling, the court stated, "These limitations, along with
the disclosure provisions, constitute the Act's primary weapons against the reality or
appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large
campaign contributions.” This decision was reconfirmed in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC in 2000, in which the court upheld Missouri's contribution limits to state
campaigns. Through their decisions, the courts have recognized the importance of removing
the undue influence, or at least the appearance of undue influence, of money from the
political system. The courts have found that the interest of society in controlling the
influence of money in the political system is more important than an individual’s right to
give unlimited money to a political candidate.
The debate over McCain-Feingold and the subsequent court battles show the
importance of understanding the impact of campaign finance reforms. The courts have
clearly supported the right, and importance of government attempts to control the undue
influence, or the appearance of undue influence, of money in the political system. An
understanding of the impact of reforms before they are enacted is important to prevent
reforms that fail to remove the undue influence of money from politics. The states have
implemented a variety of different reforms. The variation in reforms at the state level
provides an opportunity to study a variety of reforms that have not been implemented at the
national level.
The ramifications of campaign finance reforms are important to a democratic
society. Reforms play an important role in government’s effectiveness in representing its
citizens. Supporters of reforms, such as those behind the McCain-Feingold legislation,
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predicted the legislation would reduce the role of money in politics, make elections more
competitive, reduce corruption in politics, and increase voter turnout. However, opponents
argued that the legislation did not make things better and in some cases even made things
worse. For example, opponents argued that the ban on soft money, at the center of McCainFeingold, merely resulted in the shift of contributions from political parties to 527 groups.
Contributions from 527 groups have resulted in a controversy over the effectiveness of
McCain-Feingold. Supporters argue that the legislation was not flawed, but that the FEC
made an incorrect interpretation when it came to 527’s. On the other hand, opponents argue
that no legislation will be able to close all campaign finance loopholes. These groups were
named after a loophole in the tax code that allows them to receive tax-exempt contributions
for any amount from any source. The actions of political action committees have the
potential of resulting in policy outcomes not supported by a majority of citizens. If it is
important for the will of majority to prevail over the will of a minority, then it is critical to
understand the implications of campaign finance reforms as fully as possible.
There are many critical questions concerning campaign finance. One question of
concern is: What are the motivations of contributors to campaigns? Are contributors giving
money with the hope of influencing election outcomes or are they attempting to influence
legislative outcomes? The answer to this question is critical as it plays an important role in
how campaign finance is structured. Reform efforts to reduce the role, and influence of
money are different from reform efforts to reduce the influence of money in the legislative
process. For example, reform efforts that limit television ads close to the election attempt to
reduce the impact of money from the electoral process. On the other hand, reforms limiting
contributions during a legislative session are an attempt to remove the influence of money
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from the legislative process. Additionally, some reform efforts, such as contribution limits,
are an attempt to limit the effect of money in both the electoral and legislative arenas. An
understanding of the motivation, and behavior of contributors will allow us to better target
reform efforts to achieve intended consequences.
An additional question of concern surrounding campaign finance is how effective
campaign contributions are at removing the undue influence of money from the legislative
process. It is extremely important to understand the impact of money on legislative votes in
order to make more informed reform proposals. If money is not influential in deciding how a
legislator should vote, then reform efforts are less important since contributions do not make
a difference. On the other hand, if money is influential in the decision-making process then I
can examine solutions to remove the influence of money from the process.
In this dissertation, I focus on two primary questions. First, what are the motivations
of campaign contributors? Second, what is the impact of legal restrictions on contribution
patterns? More specifically, this dissertation examines the patterns of contributions in nine
state legislatures, to see if increases in contributions occur close to major legislative votes as
well as close to the election. This analysis will provide a better understanding of the motives
of contributors. Gaining a better understanding of the motives of contributors is essential in
understanding the impact of interest group activity on representation in a democratic society.
The pattern of campaign contributions under legal restrictions is a second focus of
this dissertation. I primarily focus on the impact of laws, which prohibit or limit
contributions during legislative sessions, on the strategies employed by interest groups.
When faced with session limits, do interest groups simply withdraw from the legislative
process or do they employ alternative strategies that still allow them to influence policy
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outcomes? When a limit is placed on contributions during the legislative session, the PAC
has several alternative strategies they may follow. First, they may decide not to give a
contribution to the legislator. The session limit will increase the time difference between
legal contributions and legislative votes. The increase distance between the legislative vote
and the contribution may make it more difficult to influence the outcome of the legislation
and therefore the interest group elects not to contribute. Second, a PAC may shift their
contributions to the election season. Third, they may shift their contributions to immediately
before the legislative session begins in the hope of influencing legislative outcomes during
the session. Finally, the PAC may choose to give a contribution to the legislator at the
completion of the legislative session as a reward for support during that time.
An examination of campaign finance reforms at the state level offers an opportunity
to understand the impact of reform efforts not possible at the national level. The states have
enacted a variety of different reforms. The states, therefore, serve as laboratories to
understand the effectiveness of different reforms. For example, some states place limits on
contributions during the legislative session while others do not, thus providing an
opportunity to use the differences across states to study the impact of session limits on the
strategies of interest groups.
Some states such as Illinois place few restrictions on who can give contributions, the
amount of those contributions, and when those contributions can be given. On the other
hand, states such as Georgia placed a variety of restrictions on contributions such as
contribution limits, who can give money, and when contributions can be given. An
examination of contribution patterns at the state level provides us the opportunity to examine
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what occurs in states with and without certain restrictions during the same period, thereby
serving as a control group.
Despite all the advantages of examining contribution patterns at the state level, the
majority of research has focused on the national level with little attention paid to the states.
This dissertation addresses the gap in the campaign finance literature at the state level, and
uses the analytical advantages of the states to help better understand the impact of campaign
finance reforms.
There are several additional compelling reasons to study campaign finance at the
state level. First, a state-level examination will help provide a greater understanding of how
legislative structure affects campaign contributions. For example, the United States
Congress is a professional legislative body occupied by career politicians. On the other
hand, many states have amateur legislatures that have little in common with the national
government. A state level examination will allow us to gain some purchase on how these
structural differences impact contribution decisions. Additionally, the variety of policy and
political contexts within the states allows us to gain more empirical leverage on questions of
campaign finance than possible at the congressional level (Mooney 2001). Replicating
national level findings at the state level provides more support for theories at the national
level (Hamm and Squire 2001). Finally, state legislative sessions and elections, have a much
lower profile than national elections. It is possible, given this low profile among the public,
money could play a greater role influencing voting behavior since legislators do not have to
be as concerned with public opinion and the cost of a decision at election time. Mayhew
(1974) identified re-election as the primary motivation for members of Congress; hence,
members of Congress are attempting to maximize the probability of their re-election. Money
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and votes are two of the most important factors in re-election; therefore, candidates attempt
to maximize both the amount of money received as well as the number of votes. A legislator
has to weigh the cost of voting for the position of the contributor against the loss of votes
during the election. Since state legislators receive less coverage than their national
counterparts it is possible that state legislative contributions are more successful than
contributions at the national level.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the motivations of contributors giving
campaign contributions, and to determine the strategies employed by PACs when faced with
legal restrictions. Within the discipline, it has been suggested that there are two main
motivations for campaign contributions. Particularistic2 contributors give in the hope of
influencing legislation (Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; BoxSteffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Munger 1999; Chappell 1982; Jones and Hopkins
1985; Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and
Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990; Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). Universalistic
contributors, on the other hand, give in the hope of affecting electoral outcomes (Fuchs,
Adler and Mitchell 2000; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Morton and Cameron 1992;
Mueller 1989; Mutz 1995; McAdams and Green 2000; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1985;
Snyder 1990; Welch 1974 and 1980). Given the analytical advantages of the states in
understanding the impact of campaign contributions in a variety of legal and political
contexts, this research will provide greater knowledge of the motivations of contributors and
the relevance of each of these two approaches through an analysis of contributions in nine
states. Furthermore, understanding interest group behavior is critical to understanding the
2

Particularistic contributors can be further classified into quid pro quo contributors who give with the hope of
influencing legislative outcomes or renters who give contributions as insurance to keep legislators in office that
will be more likely to support the contributor when future legislation is considered.
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impact of money on policy outcomes in the states. While it is beyond the scope of this
research to understand if money given to a legislator is successful in achieving its intended
goal, the appearance of undue influence has the potential of resulting in a mistrust of
government and increase feeling of the illegitimacy of decisions in a democratic society.
Reforms such as session limits may remove the appearance of interest groups attempting to
exercising undue influence on policy outcomes, however, it is critical to understand the true
impact of these laws if we are to understand if appearance equals true reform and reality.
Additionally, the dissertation offers suggestions on what reforms are most likely to
be successful so future reforms will be more successful. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview
of the history of campaign finance reforms in the United States. This overview of past
reform efforts provides a better understanding of previous attempts, thus enabling us to
place current reform efforts into a proper historical context. Furthermore, this overview
points out the importance of understanding how pass reform efforts have not always
achieved their intended outcomes, and that further research needs to attempt to understand
the strategies employed by contributors when faced with legal restrictions placed on their
actions.
In Chapter 3, I outline the existing research on campaign finance. First, I examine the
literature addressing the linkage between spending and election outcomes. Second, I outline
the existing studies on the motivations of contributors. This literature tends to focus on the
distinction between particularistic contributors, who give money with the hope of
influencing legislative outcomes, and universalistic contributors who give money with the
hope of influencing election outcomes. Finally, I provide an overview of the literature that
addresses questions of the link between contributions and legislator behavior.

9

In Chapter 4, I introduce my research question and hypotheses for the dissertation.
This dissertation first attempts to answer the question of why contributors give money to
state legislators. It is expected that the number of contributions to state legislators, will be
greater in the two months prior to the election when compared to the proximity to a major
legislative vote. However, the proximity to a major legislative vote is also expected to be
significant in explaining contribution patterns. A second question of interest is the impact of
session limits on contribution patterns. It is expected that PACs in states with session limits
on contributions will engage in a strategy where they provide contributions immediately
prior to the beginning of the legislative session in the hope of influencing legislative votes
during the session.
In Chapter 5, I introduce and test a model to explain campaign contributions in state
legislatures. This model is tested across twenty-five bills in nine states. It is based on the
work of Thomas Stratmann (1992, 1998, 2000) who finds at the national level that
contributions increase before important legislative votes. This dissertation builds on the
work of Stratmann by expanding the study to the state level, and to a larger variety of
legislation. The model introduced in Chapter 5 allows a determination of the motives of
contributors. It also allows us to determine how PACs respond when faced with session
limits on contributions. Understanding the response of PACs to obstacles placed in front of
them is important in providing an understanding of the link between policy outcomes and
interest group activities, and the impact of those outcomes on public perceptions of the
political system.
In Chapter 6, I present the results of my analysis. These findings provide evidence of
the pattern of contributions surrounding both the general and primary election and under
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what context we would expect the greatest increase in contributions surrounding the general
election and under what circumstances we would expect to see the greatest increase in
contributions surrounding the primary election. Additionally, these findings provide an
understanding of the role of legislative votes on contribution patterns, and address the
question of if the greatest number of contributions comes close to those major legislative
votes. The findings presented in Chapter 6 also provide us with a better understanding of the
action of PACs when faced with session limits and if those limits are successful in keeping
money out of the political system.
In Chapter 7, I discuss the implications of the findings from this dissertation. I
provide evidence of whether PACs are universalistic or particularistic contributors to state
legislators and the reforms most successful in removing the influence of money from
politics. Finally, I offer suggestions for future research that will advance our understanding
of the impact of campaign finance reforms.

Copyright ©David W. Prince 2006
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Chapter 2: The History of Campaign Finance Reforms
Throughout the history of the United States, many efforts have been put forth in an
attempt to remove the influence of money from politics3. These efforts have, in many cases,
been ineffective in completely achieving their intended goals. For example, Congress placed
contribution limits on the amount of money an individual or PAC may give to a federal
candidate. However, contributors were often able to circumvent these limits through
bundling and loopholes allowing for unlimited soft money to political parties. Many of these
reform efforts have resulted in disappointment for their supporters. Reforms implemented
without a complete as possible understanding of their effects may result in unintended
consequences not successful in removing the undue influence of money from politics. While
it is not possible to fully understand all of the ramifications of any reform proposal, or how
the courts will respond to the law, we should strive to understand the ramifications of any
proposal as thoroughly as possible prior to implementation to minimize the number of
unintended consequences brought about by an reform. A historical overview of campaign
finance shows problems that plagued previous reform efforts, and reiterates the importance
of understanding the ramifications of previous reform efforts before enacting additional
reforms. Additionally, the overview provided in this chapter illustrates the extent
contributors will go to in order to circumvent the intent of the law, and illustrates that
despite the many efforts to reform the system many citizens still do not trust their
government. This lack of trust in government illustrates that previous reform efforts have
been unsuccessful in restoring trust in government or that additional steps aside from the
3

For an additional overview of the history of campaign finance reform see Goidel, Gross and Shields (1999);
Thayer (1973); Overracker (1932); Heard (1960); and Dwyre and Farrar-Myers (2001)
For a summary of important events in the history of campaign finance please see Table 2.5. at the end of this
chapter
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campaign finance system are necessary to remove the perceived notion of corruption in
government among the people.
In this chapter, I first examine national level reforms. These reform efforts began in
the 19th century and continue until today. Second, I examine state level reforms. While
reform efforts at the national level are extremely important, the majority of elections in the
United States are state and local elections; therefore, an understanding of state level reforms
is critical to understand all efforts to remove the influence of money from politics. Finally, I
examine specific campaign finance laws in nine states that are part of this study. An
understanding of the campaign finance laws in these states is critical to understanding the
pattern of campaign contributions in them. In order to understand where we should head in
the future, it is critical that we understand what occurred in the past. An examination of past
campaign finance reforms efforts places us in a better position to provide policy
recommendations for future legislation to help restore trust in government.

1. Campaign Finance at the Federal Level
Campaign finance has received a great deal of attention in the media recently.
However, the issue has been a permanent part of the political landscape for several
centuries. Money has played a role in politics since the time of George Washington. In a
controversial move, Washington used his own money to buy alcoholic drinks for voters in
Virginia. Washington’s attempt to influence the voters was a source of controversy and early
in the history of the United States pointed to the need for campaign finance reforms.
However, reform efforts would not come until the middle of the nineteenth century.
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Initial efforts at campaign reform focused on the solicitation of money from
government workers. Such solicitation had become a way of life because of the introduction
of the “spoils system” under President Jackson. Thus, the first effort to regulate campaign
finance came in 1868 with passage of the Naval Appropriations Bill. This legislation
prohibited officers and employees of the government from soliciting money from naval yard
workers. However, parties continued to receive money from other federal employees and
political appointees.
The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 extended the provisions of the
Naval Bill that prohibited solicitations by applying them to all federal civil service workers.
These bills were a major step forward in the regulation of campaign finance because prior to
the legislation, workers often had to give to political parties in order to keep their jobs. The
necessity to provide a contribution in order to keep one’s job only served to increase public
sentiment that the system was corrupt, and not responsive to the people. While resulting in a
reduction of party reliance on government employees, the act again failed to remove money
from the system, and merely shifted the financing burden of campaigns from individuals to
businesses with a stake in federal policy outcomes. The importance of business interest in
the financing of campaigns would continue to increase through the 1880s and 1890s.
The next major step in advancing campaign finance reform came in 1907 with
passage of the Tillman Act. The act attempted to prohibit corporations and national
chartered banks from contributing directly to federal candidates. The Tillman Act was an
additional effort at attempting to remove corruption or at least the appearance of corruption
from the political system. However, the legislation proved largely ineffective due to weak
enforcement methods set forth in the legislation. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910
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was another in a series of largely ineffective attempts to regulate campaign finance. The act
attempted to establish disclosure requirements for U.S. House candidates. In 1911, the act
was extended to included Senate candidates and expanded to include expenditure limits for
congressional candidates. This legislation once again proved largely ineffective due to the
lack of mechanisms for verification and enforcement. Hence, little advancement occurred to
reduce corruption and the perception of corruption in the political system.
In 1925, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was revised, but once again, legislation
would be routinely ignored. The act attempted to revise previous campaign reform
legislation concerning spending limits and disclosure. Since the power of enforcement
resided in Congress, the Act was ignored. It was not until 1967 that Clerk of the House,
former Congressman W. Pat Jennings, collected campaign finance reports for the first time.
However, his list of violators was ignored by the Justice Department. The lack of
enforcement of the Corrupt Practices Act served to further entrench corruption as part of the
political culture, and therefore resulting in more disillusionment among the public.
In 1940, the Hatch Amendments were passed to extend previous legislation. The
amendments established a limit of $5000 per year on individual contributions to a federal
candidate or political committee. An individual could, however, give $5000 to multiple
committees working for the same candidate. This loophole resulted in legislation that was
ineffective in limiting the influence of interest groups, and corruption in the political
process. Additionally, the Hatch amendments extended campaign finance law to cover
primary as well as general elections and prohibited contributions to federal candidates from
individuals and businesses working for the federal government. In 1943, the SmithConnally Act extended the prohibition on contributions to federal candidates that already
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existed for corporations and interstate banks to include unions. The extension of the act to
cover unions was an effort to even the playing field across different types of contributors,
however, contributors were able to find loopholes in a law that was not actively enforced
thus allowing corruption to continue.
In 1944, the first political action committee was formed by the Congress of Industrial
Organizations to raise money for the re-election of President Roosevelt. The PAC money
came from voluntary contributions from union members, and therefore was legal under the
Smith-Connally Act that prohibited money going to candidates from union dues. The
formation of the first PAC provides an illustration of how loopholes in the campaign finance
law has allowed interest groups to circumvent the law, and therefore resulting in a growing
concern about the public that the political system is corrupt, and is not representative of the
view of the majority but only of a select minority. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made
permanent the ban on contributions to federal candidates from unions, corporations, and
interstate banks and extended the prohibitions to include primary elections.
Until 1971, the Corrupt Practices Act served as the basis for campaign finance law;
however, with passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971 a new framework for
the regulation of campaign financing was established. This act required full and timely
disclosure of contributions, set limits on media advertising, established limits on
contributions from candidates and their families, allowed unions and corporations to solicit
voluntary contributions, and allowed union and corporate treasury money to be used for
overhead in operating political action committees.
The 1971 Revenue Act created a public campaign fund for eligible presidential
candidates through a voluntary one-dollar check off on federal income tax. Additionally, the

16

act provided for a $50 tax deduction or a $12.50 credit, later raised to $50, for contributions
to state, local or federal candidate. However, this provision has since been eliminated. The
revenue act of 1971 was an important attempt in trying to remove the undue influence of
money from the political system through providing public funds for campaigns. However,
the public has not been very receptive about the ideal of public money going to fund
campaigns, and therefore the majority of taxpayers have not participated in the one-dollar
check off on the federal income tax form. Citizens, therefore while decrying corruption
within the system are in general reluctant to pay for campaigns. This reluctance on the part
of taxpayers creates a dilemma for reformers who have to try alternative forms of reforming
the system such as limitations on contributions during legislative sessions.
The most significant campaign reforms came in the aftermath of the Watergate
scandal. This legislation serves as the basis for most of our federal campaign finance law
today. The Federal Campaign Act Amendment of 1974 provided matching funds for
presidential primaries, public funds for presidential nominating conventions, set spending
limits for presidential and congressional primaries and elections, and created a $1000
individual per election contribution limit and a $5000 PAC limit. Additionally, the
legislation abolished limits on media advertising and created the Federal Election
Commission.
Provisions of the Federal Campaign Act of 1974 were challenged in the courts as
being an unconstitutional violation of free speech. The 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo
upheld disclosure requirements, limits on individual contributions, voluntary public
financing, and the President’s authority to appoint commissioners to the Federal Election
Commission as constitutional. However, the court ruled that limits on candidate
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expenditures are unconstitutional unless the candidate accepts public financing and that it
was unconstitutional to place limits on personal and “independent” expenditures.
In 1976, in the wake of the Buckley decision, Congress reconsidered the 1974
Federal Campaign Act and sought to bring the law in line with the Supreme Court decision.
Amendments to the 1974 act limited individual contributions to national parties to $20,000
per year, and individual contributions to PAC’s to $5000 per year. In 1979, additional
amendments increased the in-kind contributions from $500 to $1000, raised the threshold for
reporting contributions from $100 to $200, prohibited the FEC from performing random
audits, and allowed state and local parties to spend unlimited amounts on campaign
materials used by volunteers and on voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns. The
soft money loophole continued a line of failed efforts to remove corruption from the
political system, and thus led to the need for future legislation designed to close this
loophole within the existing campaign finance law.
The most recent effort to reform campaign finance is the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, otherwise known as McCain-Feingold. The act attempted to fill in loopholes
that existed in campaign finance laws passed in the 1970s. The law restricts the amount of
money parties can give to candidates and the amount that individuals can give to parties.
The act increases individual contribution amounts to $2,000 per election and to the national
party committees to $25,000. However, these limits are adjusted by a formula that penalizes
wealthy candidates for spending their own money. Additionally, the act attempts to control
the timing of ads from independent groups for federal office. The efforts under the 2002
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act were successful in curtailing unregulated soft money to
political parties, however, the political party in many cases has been replaced by 527 groups
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as recipients of soft money. These groups are tax-exempt under section 527 of the Internal
Revenue code and they are often engaged in voter mobilization efforts, issue advocacy, and
so forth with the use of soft money in many cases.
Despite the claims of supporters that the Bipartisan Campaign Act would decrease
the role of money in elections and make elections more competitive, it may have in fact
made things worse, as we have seen in previous efforts to decrease the role of money in
politics. For example, prior to the first implementation of contribution limits in 1976, the
1974 election saw 12% of House members lose their reelection attempts compared to 4% in
1976 and 6% in 1978. Additionally, in 2004 only 2% of House incumbents lost their reelection attempts, which is similar to incumbent reelection rates prior to the implementation
of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Act. An overview of incumbent re-election rates since
19644 reveal that incumbents are consistently re-elected at very high rates, and in fact
incumbents may be becoming even more secure in recent elections (see Table 2.0).
Additionally, states legislatures faced with similar restrictions as outlined in McCainFeingold have seen an increase in the percentage of votes received by the incumbent (Lott
2004).
TABLE 2.0. ABOUT HERE
There are many possible explanations of why campaign finance reforms have not
been as successful as its authors may have wished. First, incumbents have built-in
advantages such as better name recognition and the ability to use governmental resources at
their disposal to enhance electoral success. Second, incumbents have more connections and
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There is a great deal of debate over whether elections have become more or less competitive. Incumbent
reelection rates are only one component in that debate. While incumbents are being elected at higher rates than
ever to Congress many state legislatures have become much more competitive with Republicans gaining
numbers in many state legislatures.
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are in a better position to be successful in raising a lot of money through small donations.
Conversely, the incumbent may be in a position that makes it necessary to place more
reliance on larger contributions from fewer donors.
Despite the possible explanations for the failure of reform, the long history of
campaign finance reforms reveals the importance of evaluating reforms before they are
implemented on a large scale to see any possible unforeseen ramifications. Furthermore, an
overview of previous campaign finance efforts reveals a constant effort to remove
corruption and the perception of corruption from the political system. These efforts,
however, for the most part have been unsuccessful with the majority of the public still
cynical when it comes to trusting in government. In addition to reforms at the national level,
the states have implemented many different campaign finance reforms. These reform efforts
provide excellent opportunities to understand the impact of policy changes and to offer more
effective policy recommendations.

2. State Campaign Finance Reform
Campaign reform has not been restricted to the national level. By 1980, most states
required some sort of candidate disclosure, with half of the states having limits on
contributions and 16 states had some type of public financing.5 Since 1990, the majority of
states have reformed their campaign finance laws in response to rising campaign costs,
under-funded challengers, the increased influence of large donors, and the growing influence
of independent expenditures (see Tables 2.1 to 2.3). The innovative approaches taken by the
states, such as strict contribution limits, spending ceilings, and public financing of

5

For an overview of campaign finance reform in the states see Alexander (1976); Jones (1981, 1986, 1991);
Neal (1992); Herrmann and Michaelson (1994); Malbin and Gais (1998); Gross and Goidel (2004).
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campaigns serve as models for national reform. However, as is the case with federal law,
many of the laws enacted by the states have undergone scrutiny by the courts and declared
unconstitutional in many cases. The response by the courts has often led to more unique
innovations such as providing free broadcast time to candidates. These new innovations
broadened the campaign finance debate to include a completely new way of thinking about
campaign financing.
TABLES 2.1. to 2.3 ABOUT HERE
In 1991, ten states passed laws establishing or reducing contribution limits.
Additionally, from 1992 to 1996 twenty-three states and the District of Columbia revised
their campaign finance laws, including some states that made major changes in their existing
systems.6 In 1980, twenty-three states had limits on individual contributions while sixteen
states had limits on PAC contributions. The number of states with individual contributions
limits increased to thirty-four states by 1996. Additionally, by 1996 thirty-two states
imposed limits on PAC contributions. The increased attention to campaign reform
legislation by legislators has been accompanied by an interest of scholars to determine the
impact of enacted legislation. The elapse of time since the passage of many reform laws has
allowed scholars to begin to assess the impact of campaign reform. In the next chapter, I
examine research that attempts to understand the consequences of reform efforts. Finally, in
this section I provide a broad overview of campaign reforms in the states. This overview
reveals a variety of different approaches toward campaign finance reform in the states. In the
next section, I focus more specifically on the laws of the nine states included in this study.

6

Between 1992 and 1996 California, Colorado and Kentucky passed comprehensive reform packages. Maine
and Nebraska established public financing for state elections and Minnesota and Hawaii revised their public
financing programs.
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The differences in their regulations provide an opportunity to understand the impact
campaign regulations in a variety of different legal contexts.

3. Campaign Finance Laws in the Nine States Sample
There are a variety of different campaign finance laws across these states7. Some
states have very open systems with few restrictions placed on the actions of contributors. On
the other hand, in some states numerous restrictions on contributions exist in the hope of
removing the undue influence of money from the political system. These restrictions include
limitations on the amount of contributions given, when contributions can be given and
received, and who can give contributions. The states in this study include the entire
spectrum of campaign finance laws. Some states, such as Illinois, have laws that allow
nearly unlimited contributions, while others such as Wisconsin place many restrictions on
the actions of contributors.
In table 2.4, I identify campaign finance restrictions across six common types of
restrictions placed on campaign contributions in the states in this study. Each state is given a
ranking of 1, 2 or 3 with 1 indicating that type of contribution is prohibited, 2 indicating
restrictions placed on that type of contribution and 3 indicating no restrictions placed on that
type of contribution. If we weigh each of these types of contributions the same, Illinois is
clearly the least restrictive when it comes to campaign contributions with Wisconsin the
most restrictive state in the sample. This chart clearly illustrates the diversity of laws in the
sample in this study. This diversity allows us to study the impact of a variety of different

7

For additional information on campaign finance laws in the states see the National Conference of State
Legislatures web site at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/campfin.htm
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campaign finance laws, and their success at removing undue influence and the corruption of
money from the political system.
TABLE 2.4. ABOUT HERE

3.1. Illinois
As indicated in table 2.4, Illinois places few restrictions on campaign contribution in
comparison to other states. Illinois does not place limits on contribution amounts, as is the
case with California and Georgia. However, Illinois does prohibit anonymous contributions
and places limitations on fundraising during a legislative session. Candidates for the General
Assembly may not conduct a fundraiser within 50 miles of Springfield during the session
unless his or her district is within 50 miles of Springfield, however, contributors allowed to
take contributions during the legislative session. Additionally, Illinois allows for the direct
contribution of campaign donations by corporations, thus making it unnecessary for political
committees to be established to donate to a candidate.

3.2. New Mexico
New Mexico has very few restrictions on contribution limits. Individuals,
corporations, and PACs are able to give unlimited amounts of money to candidates. The
only restrictions placed on the amount of contributions are that anonymous contributions in
excess of $100 may not be accepted. Furthermore, the aggregate amount of anonymous
contributions that may be accepted by a candidate cannot exceed $2,000 in statewide races
or $500 in all other races. However, New Mexico does prohibit contributions from being
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given during a legislative session. This is the only restriction on campaign contributions in
New Mexico across the six contribution restrictions listed in table 2.4.

3.3. Utah
The campaign finance laws in Utah mirror what is seen in New Mexico. Individuals,
corporations, and PACs can give an unlimited amount to candidates. Additionally, in New
Mexico all contributions during the legislative session are prohibited, thus making the laws
in Utah slightly more restrictive than in Illinois.

3.4. California
In comparison to other states such as Georgia and Wisconsin, California has fewer
legal restrictions on campaign contributions. However, California places more restrictions
on contributions than Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah. California places restrictions on all
types of contributions listed in table 2.4 with the exception of contributions during the
legislative session. Contributions over one hundred dollars may not be made in cash.
Additionally, anonymous contributions must be less than one hundred dollars, and
contributions may not be accepted or solicited from a foreign government.
Contributions from any person or political party, other than small contributor
committees, are limited to $20,000 per election for governor, $5,000 for other statewide
offices, and $3,000 for non-statewide offices. Additionally, these limits also apply to
contributions given by one candidate to another candidate. For small contributor committees
the limits are $20,000 for governor, $10,000 for statewide, office and $6,000 for nonstatewide offices.
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Additionally, limits are placed on contributions to committees given for contributing
to candidates for state office. Contributors, however, are not limited to the amount they may
give to committees for non-election purposes. Contributions are limited to $5,000 to nonparty committees and to $25,000 for political party committees when the purpose of the
contributions is to support the election of candidates for office.

3.5. New York
The campaign finance laws in New York mirror those in California in that New York
allows all of the types of contributions indicated in table 2.4. In New York there is a
formula based on the number of enrolled voters in a candidate’s party that determines the
limit on the amount of a contribution that an individual can give to a gubernatorial
candidate. However, the amount cannot be less than $5400 or more than $16,200 in a
primary election or $33,900 in a general election.
In state legislative races, an individual can give a senate candidate $5,400 in the
primary and $8,500 in the general election. A house candidate can be given $3,400 in both
the primary and general elections. These same limits applied to individuals also apply to
corporations and PACs. However, corporations are limited to a maximum total of $5,000 per
year which makes some of the spending limits set forth previously a moot point. Individuals
are limited to a total of $150,000 per year, while there are no limits placed on PACs. Finally,
New York does not place restrictions on contributions given during the course of the
legislative session.
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3.6. South Carolina
South Carolina allows all types of contributions listed in table 2.4, however, the state
places restrictions on those. The contribution limits in South Carolina are lower than is the
case in New York and California. This difference may be the product of the fact that a
legislative race is less costly in South Carolina than in New York and California. South
Carolina limits corporations, PACs, and individuals to $3,500 per candidate per election for
statewide offices. The limit for legislative candidates is only $1,000 per candidate per
election. Political parties in South Carolina may not contribute more than $50,000 per
election cycle to any candidate for a statewide office or more than $5,000 for any other
candidate. Additionally, South Carolina prohibits lobbyists from giving contributions during
a legislative session.

3.7. Kentucky
In contrast to Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah, which allow unlimited contributions,
Kentucky prohibits the direct contribution of campaign donations by corporations, thus
resulting in the necessity of the formation of a political committee in order to contribute to a
campaign. Kentucky places a $1,000 per election limit on individual contributions.
Additionally, a person may give no more than $1,500 to all permanent committees and
contributing organizations in a given year.
Restrictions are also made on the amount of contributions that can be given by
political committees. Committees are limited to the greater of $10,000 per election cycle or
50% of the total contributions received by the candidate. Furthermore, a slate of candidates
may not accept a contribution during the 28 days immediately preceding or following a
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primary or general election. Finally, no restrictions are placed on contributions given during
legislative sessions.

3.8. Georgia
Georgia has more restrictive campaign laws than all the other states in the sample
with the exception of Wisconsin. Individuals, corporations, political committees, and
political parties are limited to a $5,000 contribution in the primary and another $5,000 in the
general election in races for statewide office. The limit drops to $2,000 in non-statewide
races. Political parties are not subject to contributions or expenditures made by a party in
support of the party ticket or a group of named candidates.
Georgia also places limits on contributions during legislative sessions. Members of
the legislature are not allowed to accept contributions during the legislative session. They
may accept funds received from a fundraising event during a legislative session, if the
fundraiser took place prior to the legislative session. Additionally, contribution restrictions
are placed on certain regulated industries and public agencies. Any individual that acts on
behalf of a public utility corporation regulated by the public service commission cannot
contribute to a political campaign.

3.9. Wisconsin
Wisconsin has the most restrictive campaign finance laws of any state in the sample.
Wisconsin is the only state in the sample to prohibit contributions from unions as well as
being one of only two states to prohibit contributions from corporations. Corporations are
prohibited from giving directly to a candidate and may only give contributions through a
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PAC. Wisconsin limits individuals to $10,000 per candidate per election in statewide races,
$1,000 in state senate races and $500 in state house races. Additionally, individuals cannot
give more than $10,000 per year to all candidates and PACs combined. The limits for PACs
are the same as those for individuals in state senate and house races, however, the limit for
gubernatorial candidates is $43,128 for PACs. Gubernatorial candidates may only accept
$485,190 from all committees during an election campaign. Senate candidates are limited to
accepting $15,525 from committees during an election campaign while the limit is $7,763
for house candidates. Corporations are prohibited from giving directly to a candidate and
may only give contributions through a PAC. Finally, lobbyists are prohibited from giving
contributions during a legislative session.

3.10. Summary of the Nine State Sample
The nine states examined in this study cover a variety of different campaign finance
laws (see Appendix A). Three states in the sample allow unlimited donations by political
action committees, individuals, and corporations. At the other end of the spectrum, two
states prohibit contributions by corporations. Additionally, there is a wide range placed on
contributions, with PAC’s limited to $1000 per election in Kentucky to unlimited
contributions in Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah. In addition to differences in contribution
limits across the states, four states allow contributions during a legislative session, three
states prohibit contributions during the session, and two states prohibit contributions by
lobbyists. The differences in limits during legislative sessions across the sample provide the
opportunity to understand the strategies employed by political action committees faced with
legal restrictions on contributions. For the purpose of this dissertation, I pay particular
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attention to the impact of session limits on contribution patterns in state legislatures. A
central focus of this dissertation is the reaction of PACs when faced with legal restrictions
that prohibit when they can give money to legislators, and thus the success of session limits
at removing corruption and the perception of corruption from the political system.

4. Summary of Campaign Finance Laws
The nine states examined in this study provide a diversity of campaign finance laws
in addition to a diversity of legislative professionalism and geographical diversity. Four
states in the sample allow unlimited contributions during legislative sessions, while the other
five states prohibit or limit contributions during the legislative session. Additionally, three
states in the sample allow unlimited contributions by corporations, labor unions, individuals,
and political action committees.
This chapter has provided an overview of the history of campaign finance reforms in
the United States at both the federal and the state level. Additionally, this chapter has
introduced the campaign laws in the states examined in this study. Particular attention has
been paid to contribution limits and session limits, which are significant for this dissertation.
The overview of the history of campaign finance reveals a history of failed attempts with
unintended consequences. This failed history points to the importance of fully examining
reform efforts. An examination of state reform efforts in general, as well as the differences
in the states considered in this study, reveals a variety of different reforms efforts and laws
which can provide us with an opportunity to understand a variety of different reform efforts
in different contexts.
TABLE 2.5. ABOUT HERE
Copyright ©David W. Prince 2006
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Table 2.0. US House Reelection Rates
Year
Reelection Rates
1964
87%
1966
88%
1968
97%
1970
85%
1972
94%
1974
88%
1976
96%
1978
94%
1980
91%
1982
90%
1984
95%
1986
98%
1988
98%
1990
96%
1992
88%
1994
90%
1996
94%
1998
98%
2000
98%
2002
96%
2004
98%
Note: The above numbers are derived from House election results provided in various
editions of America Votes: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics; the
World Almanac and Book of Facts and www.house.gov.
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Table 2.1. Campaign Finance Reforms in the States
Campaign Finance Reform
Number of States
Disclosure
50 States
Contributions Limits on Individuals
37 States
Contribution Limits on PACs
36 States
Limits on money given to political parties
35 States
Limits on Union Contributions
28 States
Limits on Corporate Contributions
23 States
Prohibition on Corporate Contributions
22 States
Prohibition on Union Contribution
14 States
Session Limits on all Contributions
14 States
Session Limits on Lobbyist Contributions
11 States
Public Financing of Campaigns (Optional) 11 States
Spending Limits
0 States
Notes: The Supreme Court ruled in the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo that spending limits
were unconstitutional unless they are optional
Taken from the Conference of State Legislatures www.ncsl.org
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Table 2.2. States without limits on contributions
States with no limit States with no
States with no
on individual
limit on PAC
limits on
contributions
contributions
corporation
contributions
Alabama
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Mississippi
Nebraska
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Texas

Alabama
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Mississippi
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Texas

Utah
Virginia

Utah
Virginia
Wyoming

Illinois
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Virginia

States with no
limits on
union
contributions
Alabama
Illinois
Iowa
Mississippi
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Virginia

Note: Taken from the Conference of State Legislatures: www.ncsl.org
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States with
no limits on
contributions
to political
parties
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Maine
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Mexico
North
Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Utah
Virginia

Table 2.3. Session limits on contributions
States with session limits on all
States with limits on lobbyist contributions
contributions
during the legislative session
Alabama
Arizona
Alaska
Colorado
Florida
Connecticut
Georgia
Iowa
Indiana
Kansas
Maine
Louisiana
Maryland
Minnesota
Nevada
North Carolina
New Mexico
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Texas
Wisconsin
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Note: Taken from the Conference of State Legislatures: www.ncsl.org
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36

3
1

1
3
3
2
3
1
2

Illinois

New
Mexico

Utah

California

New York

South
Carolina

Kentucky

Georgia

Wisconsin
2

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

Individual
Contributions

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

PAC
Contributions

Note: 1=Prohibited, 2=Restrictions, 3=Unlimited
Source: http://www.ncsl.org

Session
Contributions

State

Table 2.4. Campaign Finance Restrictions

1

2

1

2

2

2

3

3

3

Corporate
Contributions

1

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

Union
Contributions

2

3

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

Individual
Contributions
to Political
Parties

10

12

12

12

13

13

16

16

18

Total

Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance
Important Events
Year
Importance
Naval Appropriations
1868
Prohibited officers
Bill
and employees of the
government from
soliciting money
from naval yard
workers
Pendleton Civil Service
1883
Extended Naval
Reform Act
Appropriations Bill to
all federal civil
service workers
President Theodore
1905
Argued for a ban on
Roosevelt
all political
contributions by
corporations
President Theodore
1907
Called for public
Roosevelt
financing of federal
candidates via
candidates' political
parties
Tillman Act
1907
Prohibited
corporations and
national chartered
banks from making
contributions directly
to federal candidates

The Federal Corrupt
Practices Act

1910

Extension of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of
1910

1911

Loopholes

Contained no
provision for
public financing
Ban on
corporate giving
was easily
evaded or
ignored
Lack of
Enforcement

Establish disclosure
requirements for U.S.
House candidates
Extended to included Lack of
Senate candidates and Enforcement
expanded to include
expenditure limits for
congressional
candidates
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued)
Important Events
Year
Importance
Loopholes
National Democratic
1924
Included a plank,
Party Platform
proposed by William
Jennings Bryan,
calling for federal
candidates to be
furnished "reasonable
means of publicity at
public expense."
Revision of Federal
1925
Revised previous
Lack of
Corrupt Practices Act
campaign reform
Enforcement
legislation
Procedures
concerning spending
limits and disclosure
Hatch Amendments
1940
Established a limit of Individual could
$5000 per year on
give $5000 to
individual
multiple
contributions to a
committees
federal candidate or
working for the
political committee
same candidate
Hatch Amendments
1940
Extended campaign
finance law to cover
primary as well as
general elections
Hatch Amendments
1940
Prohibited
Unions not
contributions to
prohibited from
federal candidates
giving
from individuals and contributions to
businesses working
federal
for the federal
candidates but
government
businesses and
corporations
were prohibited
Smith-Connally Act
1943
Extended the
prohibition on
contributions to
federal candidates
that already existed
for corporations and
interstate banks to
include unions.
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued)
Important Events
Year
Importance
Loopholes
First Political Action
1944
Congress of
PAC money
Committee Formed
Industrial
came from
Organizations formed voluntary
to raise money for the contributions
re-election of
from union
President Roosevelt.
members, and
therefore was
not illegal under
the SmithConnally Act
that prohibited
money going to
candidates from
union dues.
Taft-Hartley Act
1947
Made permanent the
ban on contributions
to federal candidates
from unions,
corporations, and
interstate banks and
extended the
prohibitions to
include primary
elections.
Collection of Campaign
1967
Clerk of the House,
Violations of
Finance Reports for first
former Congressman law not
time
W. Pat Jennings,
enforced by the
collected campaign
Justice
finance reports.
Department
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued)
Important Events
Year
Importance
Loopholes
Federal Election
1971
Required full and
Campaign Act
timely disclosure of
contributions
Set limits on media
advertising
Established limits on
contributions from
candidates and their
families
Allowed unions and
corporations to solicit
voluntary
contributions
Allowed union and
corporate treasury
money to be used for
overhead in operating
political action
committees.
Revenue Act

1971

Created a public
campaign fund for
eligible presidential
candidates through a
voluntary one-dollar
check off on federal
income tax.
Provided for a $50
tax deduction or a
$12.50 credit, later
raised to $50, for
contributions to state,
local or federal
candidate.(Later
Eliminated)
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued)
Important Events
Year
Importance
Loopholes
The Federal Campaign
1974
Provided matching
Major
Act Amendment
funds for presidential Provisions were
primaries, public
declared to be
funds for presidential unconstitutional
nominating
by the Supreme
conventions
Court
Set spending limits
for presidential and
congressional
primaries and
elections
Created a $1000
individual per
election contribution
limit and a $5000
PAC limit.
Abolished limits on
media advertising
Created the Federal
Election
Commission.
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Money rerouted
from the same
sources into
PACs resulting
in an explosion
of the number
of PACs

Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued)
Important Events
Year
Importance
Loopholes
Buckley v. Valeo
1976
Upheld disclosure
Supreme Court Decision
requirements, limits
on individual
contributions,
voluntary public
financing, and the
President’s authority
to appoint
commissioners to the
Federal Election
Commission as
constitutional.
Ruled that limits on
candidate
expenditures are
unconstitutional
unless the candidate
accepts public
financing
Unconstitutional to
place limits on
personal and
“independent”
expenditures.
Amendments to the 1974
Federal Campaign

1976

Brought the law in
line with the Supreme
Court decision.
Limited individual
contributions to
national parties to
$20,000 per year, and
individual
contributions to
PACs to $5000 per
year.
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued)
Important Events
Year
Importance
Loopholes
Amendments to the 1974 1979
Increased the in-kind Soft Money
Federal Campaign
contributions from
Loophole
$500 to $1000
Raised the threshold
for reporting
contributions from
$100 to $200
Prohibited the FEC
from performing
random audits

Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act

Allowed state and
local parties to spend
unlimited amounts on
campaign materials
used by volunteers
and on voter
registration and getout-the-vote
campaigns.
Ban on Soft Money

2002

Increases individual
contribution amounts
to $2,000 per election
and to the national
party committees to
$25,000.
Attempts to control
the timing of ads
from independent
groups for federal
office.
Upheld Most
Provisions of the
2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Finance
Reform Act

McConnell, United States 2003
Senator, Et Al. v. Federal
Election Commission Et
Al. (Supreme Court
Case)
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527 Loophole

Chapter 3: Literature Review
In this dissertation, I attempt to address three important questions that are derived out
of gaps in the existing literature. First, what motivates contributors to give campaign
contributions to state legislators? Second, what is the impact of legal restrictions on the
pattern of campaign contributions, and, in particular, what is the impact of session limits on
the strategies employed by political action committees? Finally, I provide some suggestions
on reforms that may provide the best opportunity to remove the undue influence of money
and corruption from the political system.
The campaign finance literature is vast and examines a number of important issues.
However, the impact of campaign finance laws is a common thread that bounds all the
literature together. Campaign finance laws are at the center of all decisions made by
contributors and recipients of contributions and have to be considered no matter what the
specific question under consideration may be. Spending limits are an important factor to
consider when examining the affects of spending on electoral outcomes. Additionally, limits
on the amount and timing of contribution have to be considered when attempting to
understand not only electoral outcomes but legislative outcomes as well.
The key focus of this dissertation is to understand the motivations and actions of
contributors, however, it is also important to understand the impact of those motivations in
order to provide insight into the direction of future campaign finance reforms. As indicated
in chapter two there have been many efforts to implement the campaign finance system,
however, most of these efforts have been unsuccessful at increasing public trust of
government. In addition to an overview of the literature on the motivations of contributors,
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this chapter also examines the literature on the impact of universalistic and particularistic
contributions.
The first two sections in this chapter provide an overview of the factors that explain
campaign spending and the effects of spending on electoral outcomes. The first section
examines the effects of institutional and legal differences on campaign spending patterns.
The second section examines the effect of spending on electoral outcomes. The first two
sections show if a link exists between spending and electoral outcomes. If there is no link
between spending and electoral outcomes then we would expect most contributors would be
particularistic contributors, who are attempting to influence the outcome of a legislative
vote, instead of universalistic contributors, whose contribution is a waste of resources since
it has no bearing on the election outcome. It is extremely important to have an
understanding of the effects of spending on electoral outcomes if we want to understand the
motives of contributors. In the third section, I examine the literature on why contributors
give money and to whom it is given. This section is closely related to the first two sections
in that patterns of campaign contributions may influence election outcomes. An
understanding of the literature in both sections is critical to understanding what motivates
contributors. If spending has no affect on electoral outcomes, it is very unlikely interest
groups would be giving contributions in hopes of affecting an election outcome unless they
miscalculate the importance of their contribution. However, interest groups are unlikely to
miscalculate the importance of a contribution as they become very skilled at how the system
works to achieve the desired outcome. Nevertheless, if spending does affect election
outcomes then interest groups may be motivated by election outcomes and/or legislative
outcomes.
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The final question in this chapter examines the literature that addresses questions
concerned with the impact of campaign contributions on the behavior of legislators. This
final set of literature represents the last and perhaps the most important stage in
understanding the impact of campaign contributions. If campaign contributions do not affect
the action of recipients, then reform efforts are much less important. Consistent with the
previous questions, the importance of campaign finance laws is critical in understanding the
behavior of legislators. Legislators are keenly aware of restrictions placed on their actions,
and how well those restrictions are enforced. The primary goal of most legislators is their
desire to be re-elected, which drives many of their decisions. Legislators need money for
their re-election campaigns, but also have to consider the ramifications of failing to follow
legal restrictions on campaign contributions.

1. Factors that affect spending
Many different factors have been identified to explain candidate-spending levels.
The states provide an excellent opportunity to study the effects of different institutional
structural patterns on candidate spending, however, the lack of available data has limited the
amount of state level research conducted. Hogan and Hamm (1998) found the population
size of a district was the most important factor in predicting a candidate’s spending level.
Additionally, they found spending was higher in states with restrictive campaign finance
laws, more professional legislatures, and where party control of the legislature was in doubt.
Moncrief and Patton (1993) and Stonecash (1990) also found spending was higher when
partisan control of the legislature was not certain. Likewise, Moncrief and Thompson (1998)
found spending was higher in Idaho and Stonecash (1990) found it was higher in New York
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when control of the legislature is uncertain. These findings indicate higher spending is
consistent across legislatures of different professional levels when control of the legislature
is uncertain.
State legislative research has not been confined to general elections; it has also
examined spending in primary elections. Breaux and Gierzynski (1998) found incumbents
spend more than challengers and open-seat candidates in primary elections. Additionally,
primary expenditures were found to be higher in professional states. Hogan (1999) extended
the previous research and found the district population size and the number of primary
opponents affects spending. Hogan’s results were in conflict with previous findings that
indicate greater spending levels occur in states that are more professional. He found that in
these states the majority of money from interest groups and political parties was saved for
the general election and not used during the primaries.
The findings of Hogan and Hamm (1998) are opposite of what we expect to find and
provide some evidence that legal restrictions have not been successful at decreasing
spending in elections. However, the relationship between spending and legal restrictions is
still not fully understood (Gross and Goidel 2004). Moreover, as noted by Gross and Goidel
(2004), the impact of campaign finance regulations is dependent upon the nature of the
regulation in place. Campaign finance regulations tend to exert their biggest effect on
incumbent spending, however, this does not translate into a greater share of the vote for the
incumbent and therefore has little impact on the outcome of the election (Gross and Goidel
2004). Additional research needs to examine how spending patterns change when faced
with various legal restrictions. Furthermore, the increased level of spending in campaigns
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has only served to further dissolution the public and their perceptions of interest groups
possessing to much influence on a corrupt political system.

2. Effects of spending upon electoral developments
The literature on electoral developments addresses reform efforts to make elections
more competitive. Making elections more competitive is one of the primary motivations of
campaign finance reform, thus making the United States more democratic by giving the
voters more choices and increasing involvement by citizens in the political process.
Additionally, competitive elections result in citizens that believe that their vote matters and
they can have a voice in a political system perceived as non-responsive to the average
citizen. In the United States, most elections are non-competitive with the incumbent easily
winning re-election. Non-competitive elections pose a potential problem for a democratic
society since voters have no real choice. One motivation for the implementation of
campaign finance laws and reforms to existing campaign finance laws is to increase
electoral competition that in turn results in a system seen as more legitimate by citizens.

2.1. Outcomes
A number of scholars have examined the affects of spending on electoral developments.
More specifically, the relationship between spending, electoral competition, and whether
spending results in more competitive elections is a key question addressed in the literature.
Additionally, the link between money spent and the knowledge of the electorate is an
important question. Finally, it is important to understand if spending translates into higher
turnout at the polls. Spending may make elections more competitive and the electorate more
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informed, however, that does not necessarily mean that more voters will show up at the
polls. Turnout is one factor that serves an indicator of public trust of the political system. If
voters see the system as corrupt and responsive only to the special interest then they may see
their vote as useless in affecting policy outcomes, therefore increased voter turnout is a sign
of a system the people believe they can change and that their vote can make a difference.
Many explanations attempt to explain why incumbents are so successful in winning
reelection. Central to this literature are the effects of campaign finance law and reform
efforts on the outcome of an election. If we hope to offer policy recommendations
concerning future campaign finance reforms, it is important that we understand the impact
of reforms on electoral outcomes.
While the key focus of this paper is the impact of campaign finance laws on the
actions of interest groups in trying to influence policy outcomes, it is important to recognize
that campaign finance laws do not operate in isolation. Laws that may affect electoral
outcomes in a positive way may have an adverse affect in the policy arena. In offering
policy recommendations, it is critical that we understand the full ramifications of any policy
we are choosing to implement so we are not surprised by the outcomes. While fully
understanding the impact of every reform is not always possible, we should strive for the
best understanding of the potential ramifications of every reform before it is enacted.
Furthermore, ineffective reform efforts not only fail to solve the problem they were intended
to solve, but may also serve to further solidified the belief among the public that corruption
is a part of the political system, and that is unlikely to change any time in the future.
Jacobson has conducted the seminal works in campaign finance of the effects of
spending on election outcomes. Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985, 1990) and Abramowitz (1988,
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1991) argue that incumbents receive little benefit from campaign expenditures since they are
already well known by the voters. This evidence suggests that campaign contribution limits
would hurt challengers with little name recognition. Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkart
(1976) found similar findings for the California State Assembly, and the differences in the
effects of incumbent and challenger spending were confirmed by Olson (1983) in Texas
state legislative elections and Giles and Pritchard (1985) in Florida as well as other scholars
such as Caldeira and Patterson (1982), Tucker and Weber (1987) and multiple state studies
by Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) and Cassie and Breaux (1998). These findings are
generally explained by the suggestion that incumbents are most likely to spend money when
they are most threatened in their re-election bids, thus providing an explanation for the
difference in the impact of incumbent and challenger spending. Additionally, with the
incumbent usually enjoying a huge advantage when it comes to name recognition, the
challenger often needs a lot more money than the incumbent does in order to be successful
in winning the election. However, other scholars have not found the same differences in the
impact of incumbent and challenger spending (Green and Kranso 1988; Goidel and Gross
1994). However, even if campaign contributions limits are unsuccessful at causing more
incumbents to be defeated, they may have a different affect on legislative decisions and
these differing affects need to be weighed against one another in offering reform proposals.

2.1. Competition
Increasing competition in elections have been at the center of many campaign
finance reform proposals. However, legal restrictions have not always been successful at
achieving their intended objectives and in some cases may have resulted in elections that
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were even less competitive. The lack of competitiveness of elections in turn results in some
citizens feeling they have little say in government, as the outcome of most elections seems
to be predetermined. In turn, citizens that feel they have little say in who is elected also feel
that their voice is not heard in the legislative process.
Evidence of the importance of spending on the vote share in federal elections is
clearly mixed. These findings are also consistent with studies of state level elections.
Jacobson’s (1978) argument that incumbent spending did not affect the vote was supported
at the state level by Welch (1976). Additionally, Tucker and Weber (1987) conclude that
party strength is more important than candidate spending in determining vote share.
However, Owens and Olson (1977), in their study of California legislative elections,
conclude that spending is the best predictor of the vote, and incumbency and party strength
were only of secondary importance. Caldeira and Patterson (1982) confirmed these findings
in California and Iowa, thus providing evidence that the previous findings were not
exclusive to California. However, these studies still suffer from a lack of generalizability
which Gierzynski and Breaux (1993) attempt to address through an examination of twelve
states. They conclude that partisan influences on a candidate’s vote share were stronger in
some states than in others and that contributions were more important in those states with
weak partisan influences.
Adamany (1969) was among the first to address the question of spending levels in
state elections through his examination of elections in Wisconsin. While he found that
spending levels in dollar terms was not very high, his primary concern was spending
inequality among candidates. He found that many potential candidates could not raise the
money to be able to compete effectively. The lack of competitiveness in elections results in

51

citizens feeling they have little say in government controlled by candidates with money from
special interest. Other scholars such as Neal (1992), Hogan (1999), and Breaux and
Gierzynski (1998) also suggest these concerns. The difference between incumbent and
challenger spending has been the catalyst for many calls for campaign finance reform to
level the playing field between incumbents and challengers. This inequality in spending
among candidates has been the incentive for caps on the amount of money that candidates
can spend in elections. However, soft money and other loopholes often allow candidates to
get around these requirements. These loopholes serve to increase the perception of
corruption among the political and thus provide evidence of the need to refine existing law
to remove corruption and the perception of corruption from the political system.
Other scholars argue that incumbent expenditures are important when the quality of
the challenger is considered in the equation (Green and Kranso 1988, 1990: Goidel, Gross
and Shield 1999; Goidel and Gross 1994; Thomas 1989; Erikson and Palfrey 1998, 2000;
Gerber 1998). As such, these scholars argue that contribution limits may actually increase
competition and that equal spending levels may increase challenger success. Campaign
spending by challengers has a positive effect on challenger vote share, and incumbent
spending has a positive, although smaller, impact on incumbent vote shares (Grier 1989;
Green and Krasno 1988; Levitt 1984). Finally, contribution limits do not affect just
electoral competition but also impact voter turnout, the number of candidates, and partisan
competition (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hogan 2000; Gross, Shields
and Goidel 2002; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castilli 2001).
The affects of spending on electoral competition are not fully established in the
literature. These findings have interesting implications for the study of the motivations of
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interest groups. If spending has an impact on electoral competition, then political action
committees may be motivated by trying to influence the outcome of the election. On the
other hand, if spending does not affect competition then there is little incentive for
contributors to give with the hope of influencing the outcome of the election, and they are
likely providing contributions for other motivations such as influencing legislative
outcomes.
The impact of contribution limits on spending is not understood completely in the
literature. Campaign contribution limits are often enacted with the hope of decreasing
spending in elections. However, limits often do not achieve their intended effect. A decrease
in contribution limits may be offset by an increase in the number of contributors giving to
the campaign. Changes in contribution limits do not necessarily result in less spending, but
in the acquisition of donations from a broader spectrum of sources. However, while
spending in elections may not decrease as the result of contribution limits increasing the
number of contributors necessary to raise the money necessary to run a campaign is
important as it decreases corruption and the perception of corruption by involving more
contributors in the process. The more contributors that are involved in the process the lower
the perception of one individual contributor being able to gain undue influence over the
policy making process.
Campaign contributions limits have been enacted to increase electoral
competitiveness (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hogan 2000; Gross, Shields
and Goidel 2002; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castilli 2001). However, they have not always
achieved their desired goals. Some scholars have found a positive relationship between
limits and competition (Krasno and Green 1993; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990) while others
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have found a negative relationship (Jacobson 1980; Sorauf 1992; Alexander 1992; Teixeira
1996).
Additionally, even if contribution limits exist, spending in campaigns will increase if
a highly qualified challenger enters the race, thus making the election more competitive
(Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hogan 2000; Gross, Shields, and Goidel
2002). Hogan (2000), through an examination of a variety of context for various candidate
and state-level factors, concludes that campaign contribution limits have been effective in
reducing spending. However, he notes that limits would have been more successful if
interest groups had not found alternative ways of funneling money to candidates. These
findings are in contrast to other scholars that have noted contribution limits do not
necessarily reduce overall spending. Gross, Shield and Goidel (2002) find contributions
limits do not limit total spending and actually increase spending among incumbents and
Democrats in states with more restrictive limits.
The impact of contribution limits is varied and the affects are not always completely
understood. First, contribution limits negatively affect the incumbent’s future share of the
vote. However, incumbents responsible for passage of contribution limits do not suffer at the
polls (Stratmann). Second, campaign contribution limits lessen the difference in candidate
spending (Hogan 2000). Third, limits affect the distribution of contributions among
candidates and the frequency of contributions, however, this relationship is not completely
understood (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994;
Hinich 1977; Welch 1974). The impact of campaign finance laws is not always clear and
may result in unintended consequences, and therefore caution must be exercise before
passing any legislation. For example, contribution limits may restructure how donations are
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collected, but do not necessarily result in less spending. The passage of a contribution limit
may result in a greater number of contributors to the candidate, but placing limits on
contributors does not necessarily result in less spending by the candidate during the election.
Furthermore, the enactment of unsuccessful legislation has been ineffective in restoring
public trust in political leaders.

2.3.Knowledge and Interest
Campaign spending is an issue of importance, as it influences the quality of
democracy of the United States. A key aspect of an effective democracy is an informed
electorate. As with the previous questions we examined, an understanding of campaign
finance laws is central to understanding how citizens receive their information and is at the
center of how the electorate is informed. An effort to limit the role of independent
expenditures and issue advocacy ads and when these can be used affects the way the
electorate is informed. Coleman and Manna (2000) examine U.S. House elections from 1994
to 1996 and conclude that spending results in better-informed citizens and does not damage
public trust or involvement one-third of the time. They conclude that spending has positive
affects on democracy through increased public understanding of the candidates and the
issues. These findings are in contrast, however, to other scholars who find that spending
does not necessarily result in a better-informed electorate (Goidel, Gross, Shields 1999).
Additionally, Franklin (1991) concludes it may be more in the interest of the challenger than
the incumbent to confuse voters about the incumbent. This finding reveals that greater
spending results in a less accurate portrayal of the incumbent and therefore this is not good
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for democracy. Confusion among voters often results in an electorate that feels
unrepresentative in government and in turn often chooses not to vote.

2.4. Turnout
Voter turnout tends to be low in the United States. The lack of participation by has
resulted in efforts to get out the vote and encourage citizens to vote. Low voter turnout is
especially evident in primary, midterm and local races. In most cases, less money is spent on
these elections making them lower profile. Combined with the lower levels of candidate
spending, and less media coverage these races result in lower levels of voter turnout. The
literature on the link between spending and voter turnout generally finds a positive
relationship. Jacobson (1978, 1980), and Caldeira and Patterson (1982) find that increases in
spending result in higher levels of voter turnout. Furthermore, Dawson and Zinser (1976)
find that turnout in congressional races increases 1 to 2 percent for every $1000 increase in
expenditures, and Conway (1981) finds a significant relationship between turnout and the
spending level of congressional Democratic candidates in midterm elections in the 1970s.
Conversely, Kenney and Rice (1985) argue that under the current presidential primary
system spending is not likely to have a significant impact on voter turnout during primaries.
However, spending may affect turnout under a different primary structure. The link between
spending and turnout results in a dilemma for reformers. Voter participation is touted as a
positive, however, high-spending levels may be a negative for a democracy since
challengers can rarely match the spending of incumbents. Furthermore, high-spending levels
increase the need for contributions, and the influence of PACs in the political process. The
increase in the influence of PACs in the political system creates cynicism among the public
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and raises the question of the need to reform the existing system to diminish the undue
influence of contributors in the political system.

3. Literature on Contributors
Campaign contributions are provided to candidates running for office by a variety of
different sources. Individuals, interest groups, political action committees, businesses,
corporations, and political parties all provide contributions to candidates running for office.
The motivation and strategies employed by contributors are key questions addressed within
the literature as well as in this dissertation. As with all the literature, an understanding of
legal environment in which contributors operate is critical to fully understanding the
strategies employed by contributors.

3.1. Why do contributors give money?
One of the most important questions addressed in the literature is why campaign
contributions are given to certain candidates. Some interest groups employ an electoral
strategy while others give contributions in order to gain access to elective officials (Jacobson
and Kernell 1982; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Langbein 1986; Wright 1989). Additionally,
research reveals two major reasons for campaign donations: influencing policy and affecting
electoral outcomes. One set of research findings suggests that contributions are given with
the hope of influencing public policy (Ben-Zion and Eyton 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion
1975; Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Kau and Rubin 1982). Additional research has
progressed beyond prediction toward a quantitative assessment of the relationship between
contributions and votes.
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Particularistic contributors attempt to influence policy for their personal benefit
(Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992;
Cox and Munger 1999; Chappell 1982; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Hendrie, Salant and
Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990;
Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). On the other hand, universalistic contributors
donate money with the hope of affecting election outcomes (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell
2000; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Morton and Cameron 1992; Mueller 1989; Mutz
1995; McAdams and Green 2000; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1985; Snyder 1990;
Welch 1974 and 1980). Universalistic contributors’ efforts benefit a much broader segment
of the population since all supporters of the candidate benefit through their efforts to elect
them to office.
Particularistic contributors can further be divided into two subsets. Quid pro quo
contributors give with the hope of receiving a positive legislative vote in return for their
contribution. On the other hand, some particularistic contributors provide contributions as
insurance to keep legislators in office who support their position. Quid pro quo contributors
are of a greater concern to reformers desiring to limit the undue influence of money in
politics, since they are attempting change a legislator’s vote in exchange for a campaign
contribution. One set of research has argued that contributors are not trying to “buy votes,”
but instead want to increase the probability that unfavorable legislation will not be enacted
by giving to those that are already likely to support their position (Aranson and Hinich 1979;
Hinich 1977). Conversely, other studies have found that contributions are an attempt to
influence legislation outcomes (Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; BoxSteffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Munger 1999; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Hendrie,
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Salant and Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder
1990; Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). As discussed previously, the bulk of
campaign contributions are given to incumbent candidates who have high re-election rates;
therefore, it is reasonable to assume that contributors are hoping to achieve something
beyond just the election of a particular candidate. Understanding the strategies and motives
of contributors allows us to better reform the system to remove corruption from the system.

3.2. Who gets money and whom does it benefit?
A basic question addressed in the literature on interest group contributions is who
receives contributions. Jones and Borris (1985) were the first to conclude that in state
legislative elections PACs tend to give money to gain influence with legislators instead of
attempting to target close legislative races. The literature discusses six factors in explaining
who receives interest group contributions-incumbent status (Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie
and Thompson 1998), constituency interests (Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Denzau and
Munger 1985; Stratmann 1992), committee membership (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier
and Munger 1991; Welch 1974), leadership position (Thielemann and Dixon 1994),
candidate gender (Thompson, Moncrief, and Hamm (1998) and closeness of the election
(Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982).
The literature on campaign contributions has found that contributors tend to give
more money to incumbent candidates (Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie and Thompson 1998).
Interest groups desiring to influence policy outcomes target their contributions to those most
likely to hold office and be in a position to impact legislative outputs, therefore with high
incumbent re-election rates it reasons that incumbents would receive the majority of
contributions in a system driven by particularistic contributors. On the other hand,
59

universalistic contributors would target their resources to vulnerable incumbents and
challengers in competitive races. What may seem like a contribution to influence an election
outcome may in fact be an attempt to gain undue influence of an elective official in office.
In contrast to interest groups, parties give more money to challengers (Jones and
Borris 1985; Stonecash 1998, 1990; Thompson and Cassie 1992; Gierzynski and Breaux
1994, 1998; Malbin and Gais 1998; Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell 1994; Cassie and
Thompson 1998). Schecter and Hedge (2001) found that in Florida political parties are
especially more likely to give money to challengers in competitive races. The difference in
the targeting of contributions by interest groups and parties indicates that political parties are
more interested in maximizing the number of seats in the legislature while interest groups
are interested in gaining influence with office holders.
The interests of the constituency (Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Denzau and
Munger 1985; Stratmann 1992) play a role in campaign donations. Denzau and Munger
(1985) use a constrained maximization model in which three agents have preferences over
policy outcomes. Interest groups contribute in order to improve their own wealth, voters
provide votes to obtain outcomes closer to their desired position, and legislators seek both
campaign contributions and votes in order to obtain re-election. In this model, legislators are
constantly weighing their options between the concerns of the constituents and the money
provided by interest group contributions. The difficult decision on casting a legislative vote
arises when the preferences of the contributor are not in agreement with the preferences of
the constituents.
Additionally, money is most likely to be contributed to candidates in close races
(Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982) and those that serve on committees of importance to the
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concerns of the contributor (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1991; Welch
1974). When the outcome of an election is close, contributors often sense the opportunity to
affect their position in the legislature by defeating an unfavorable incumbent or they fear the
defeat of a member supportive of their position. Furthermore, in a close election the winner
may feel an increased sense of obligation to contributors who may help pull him or her over
the top to win the election. Campaign contributions are a limited resource. Contributors have
to exercise care in maximizing the benefits received from their donations. It is very difficult
for challengers to overcome the advantages held by incumbents, therefore it is often a poor
allocation of resources to pour money into a challenger’s campaign that is likely to be
defeated. Hence, in states with strong committee systems, committees are often able to kill
legislation independent of the desires of the full chamber, hence an interest group has the
possibility of killing legislation prior to consideration by the committee of the whole. Other
members of the legislature that are not as knowledgeable in an area often defer to the
committee, accordingly the committee is in the best position to shape legislation in favor of
the interest groups position.
Thielemann and Dixon (1994) found that contributors are motivated by a candidate’s
place in the legislative leadership. Those in position of leadership receive more contributions
than rank and file members. Additionally, women were found to receive fewer contributions
in highly professional legislatures than men (Thompson, Moncrief, and Hamm 1998). This
may be the product of the dominance of parties, PACs, and interest groups in these states,
resulting in women still seen as outsiders and not as viable candidates. Hogan and
Thompson (1998) found that minority candidates did not receive as much money as white
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candidates, but differences in the gender and racial gaps in fundraising were not that great
and the gaps may further diminish as more minorities and women gain leadership status.
In addition to examining the direct effects of spending on vote shares, a few studies
have addressed the question of how laws affect a candidate’s ability to raise money. For the
most part, these studies have been confined to the effects of spending (Abramowitz 1991;
Goidel and Gross 1994, 1996; Goidel, Gross and Shield 1999; Green and Krasno 1988;
Gross, Goidel, and Shields 1997; Jacobson 1980) and the sources of fundraising (Sorauf
1988, 1992) at the national level. Sorauf (1992) finds that incumbents learn to exploit the
PAC system to raise large sums of money that far exceed challengers. Incumbents therefore
are able to build “war chests” to deter challengers from running against them (BoxSteffensmeier 1996). The large amounts of money at the disposal of incumbents in turn
serve to alienate the public from the political system. Additionally, Abramowitz (1991)
concludes that the decrease in electoral competition can be contributed to a decrease in a
challenger’s ability to raise money. The enactment of campaign finance laws to reduce
spending in elections has resulted in the unintended consequence of inhibiting challengers’
ability to raise money, thereby decreasing their success since challengers have a greater need
for money than incumbents to get their message out to the public.
Studies of state campaign contributions provide an opportunity to study a broader
array of regulatory context. Many studies, have been limited to one or only a few states
(Donnay and Ramsden 1995; Mayer and Wood 1995; Redfield 1996) or even single state
studies (Kettl et al, 1997; Redfield 1995, 2000). However, some scholars have attempted
comprehensive studies of campaign finance systems (Malbin and Gais 1998; Mayer 1997;
Thompson and Moncrief 1998). The few studies conducted at the state level have found that
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PAC money goes mostly to incumbents (Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie and Thompson
1998) and that parties give more to challengers than other types of contributors (Malbin and
Gais 1998; Gierynski and Breaux 1998).

4. Contributions and legislative behavior.
The timing of campaign contributions is an important question in the campaign
finance literature, as this research provides not only insight into the motivation of
contributors, but also the action of recipients in response to receiving a donation. An
important question debated in this literature is the impact of campaign contributions on
legislators’ issue positions. The key question addressed in this literature is how often a
contribution results in a change in the vote that would have been cast if the contribution had
not been received. Many scholars have found a strong correlation between contributions and
votes on legislation (Silberman and Durden 1976; Chappell 1981, 1982; Kau Keenan and
Rubin 1982; Welch 1982, Fendreis and Waterman 1985; Grier and Munger 1986; Hall and
Wayman 1990; Endersby and Munger 1992; Stratmann 1991, 1995; Kroszner and Strahan
2000). However, many of these studies suffer from a simultaneous equation bias, in that if
interest groups contribute to legislators who support them anyway, the impact of
contributions on vote decisions would be overestimated. It is extremely difficult to isolate
the impact of campaign contributions on legislative votes, since often a legislator would
have voted the same without the contribution.
Stratmann (2000) attempts to overcome the simultaneous equation bias problem, that
exists in examining the relationship between contributions and legislative votes, by
examining the behavior of legislators at different points in time. Stratmann (1992, 2000)
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provides only a couple of studies that quantitatively examine the behavior of recipients of
campaign contributions. He examines roll call votes on price supports and quotas for various
farm commodities in 1981 and 1985 (Stratmann 1992). The results show that without
campaign contributions, farm interest would have lost seven out of ten votes. Additionally,
campaign contributions given at the time of a vote had a greater impact on voting behavior
than those given one or two years prior to a vote. Stratmann (2000) examines financial
services legislation and finds results similar to his previous work. Changes in contribution
levels determine changes in roll call voting behavior. Additionally, contributions from
competing groups are partially offsetting and senior members are less responsive to changes
in contribution levels than junior legislators.
Stratmann (1998) studies the timing of campaign contributions to determine the
objective of PACs. He includes three variables in his model to explain weekly contributions.
The vote event is the first variable included in his study. The variable is coded as one for the
two weeks during which votes on the farm bill occurred as well as one for the three weeks
before, and after the vote weeks with all other weeks coded as zero. The second variable
included in the model is the general election that equals one for each week in the months of
September and October and zero for all other weeks. The third variable included in the
model is the primary variable that equals one for each week from the end of February to mid
May. He estimates his model of campaign contributions using a Poisson regression, and his
results reveal that PACs are attempting to influencing congressional votes as well as
elections. Contributions increase in the weeks surrounding important legislative votes as
well as the election. In 1985 the number and amount of contributions surrounding the Farm
Bill vote was significantly higher than the primary but was not as great as the general
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election. He concludes by stating that PACs use contributions as a mechanism to keep
legislators from reneging on quid pro quo agreements.
It is extremely difficult to access the impact of contributions on the behavior of
legislators and whether those contributions result in undue influence of the contributor.
Stratmann’s (1998) model serves as the basis for this research. While the model does not
allow us to determine the impact of contributions, it does serve the important purpose of
providing insight into the behavior of contributors. Our knowledge of interest group
influence in the legislative process is limited almost exclusively to the federal level, and
even that literature is not fully developed to the point where we can make broad
generalizations of the influence of contributions on the behavior of legislators. Expanding
the current literature to the state level will allow us to make some inroads to understanding
the impact of contributions across various legal and institutional differences.

5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an overview of the campaign finance
literature. Through out this entire literate we see a common theme. Many different efforts
have been put forth in order to remove the undue influence of money from the political
system. However, despite all of these efforts public mistrust of government survives. These
reform efforts have often failed because interest groups recognize loopholes within those
laws and change their strategies to reflect the new environment in which they operate.
In the first section, I examined factors that affect spending, which is structured by a
variety of factors including electoral conditions, institutional structures and legal
restrictions. In the second section, I examined the affects of spending on electoral outcomes.
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In the third section, I examined the motivations of contributors and whom they target in
providing contributions. Finally, I examined the impact of contributions on legislative
behavior. Three key points emerge from an examination of the literature. First, campaign
finance regulations have to be placed at the center of our research in order to understand
what the impact of money is on electoral or legislative outcomes. Political action
committees operate in a maze of laws and regulations that dictate their behavior, and failure
to include these factors will result in an incomplete understanding of the role of money in
the political process. Second, the majority of the existing literature is at the federal level
with our knowledge of campaign finance at the state level much more limited. The states
provide us with many potential opportunities for research since they operate under a variety
of different legal systems. This variation is not present at the national level, thus conducting
more state level research is critical to understanding the impact of campaign finance laws.
The state level examination places us in a position to provide more sound policy
recommendations as to the direction reform should take to remove undue influence from the
legislative process and to make elections more competitive. Finally, while many questions
have been answered in the literature, many questions remain. Whom the recipients of
campaign contributions are is well established in the literature. Incumbents and those in the
best position to influence policy outcomes are the most likely to receive campaign
contributions, however, the impact of money on legislative and electoral outcomes is mixed.
There have been many advances in our understanding of the role of money in the political
process, however, much is still unclear. This dissertation will bridge some of these gaps in
the existing literature by providing a greater understanding of why contributors give money
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in state legislative elections and how they respond when confronted with legal restrictions
on their actions.
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Chapter 4: Theory and Hypotheses
In chapter three, I discussed two main motivations for campaign contributors. First,
universalistic contributions are given with the hope of influencing election outcomes (Fuchs,
Adler and Mitchell 2000; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Morton and Cameron 1992;
Mueller 1989; Mutz 1995; McAdams and Green 2000; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1985;
Snyder 1990; Welch 1974 and 1980). Second, particularistic contributions are given with the
desire to influence legislative votes (Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974;
Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Munger 1999; Chappell 1982; Jones and
Hopkins 1985; Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and
Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990; Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). This dissertation
attempts to determine if PACs are attempting to influence the outcome of legislative votes.
Additionally, this dissertation attempts to determine what strategies PACs employed when
faced with prohibitions on contributions during the legislative session. It is expected that the
election will be the main factor in explaining campaign contributions. It is also expected that
a portion of contributors given two months prior to the election are particularistic
contributors attempting to ensure the election of a candidate most sympathetic to their cause.
Furthermore, some particularistic contributors appear to be universalistic contributors due to
legal restrictions, such as session limits, that force them to provide contributions at a time
different from the legislative session.
Particularistic contributions are theorized to be more effective at the state level than
at the national level for several reasons. First, state legislation tends to be less salient with
citizens than national legislation. Most news coverage is focused at the national level with
less attention paid to state legislation, thereby limiting the information the public receives
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concerning state politics. This lack of attention to state issues by the media results in a less
informed public. Because of the lack of news coverage, the public is less aware of what is
going on in their state governments, which allows the recipients of contributions to change
their position without fear of electoral consequences. Additionally, state legislatures tend to
be less professional then the United States Congress. Hence, electoral concerns may not be
as great in amateur legislators, thus decreasing the risk for changing one’s vote based on a
contribution. Squire’s (1992) measure of professionalism uses Congress as the base line for
a professional legislature, and the index he formulates attempts to determine how closely
state legislatures resemble Congress. He finds that New York has the most professional state
legislature, however, it is still not as professionalized as the United States Congress.
Schlesinger (1966) notes that political ambition varies from one state to the next based upon
the opportunity structure in that state. In professional states, there are more opportunities for
those with political ambitions to advance in their careers, therefore electoral concerns are
more important to legislators in those states. Conversely, in states without the opportunity
for advancement, electoral concerns are not as great. Rhyme (2000) shows that state
legislatures have a high rate of turnover, with most legislative leaders staying in their
positions for five years or less. Additionally, eighteen states have term limits8, thereby
forcing members to retire resulting in significant turnover in the future (Rhyme 2000). The
high turnover in state legislatures, along with the increased enactment of term limits, results
in legislators being less concerned with re-election, which results in less need for campaign
donations. Furthermore, term limits may decrease contributions given as a reward after a
8

California is the only state included in this study that has term limits for state legislators. Members of the
state senate are limited to two terms for a total of eight years and members of the Assembly are limited to 3
terms for a total of 6 years. It is unlikely that term limits have an affect on interest group activities in California
due to the fact that most members, upon being term limited out of office, chose to run for a different office and
thereby it is in the interest of the contributor to want to continue a positive relationship with the legislator.
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positive vote given the fact that the contributor may not need to establish a long-term
relationship with the legislator.

1. Contributions and Critical Time Points
There are seven key points during the course of the election and legislative process.
Interest groups have to decide if they are going to contribute at each of these key points.
Particularistic and universalistic contributors are likely to make different evaluations as to
whether to contribute at each one of these time periods.
The primary is the first critical time point in which contributors have to decide if
they are going to contribute. The decision to contribute prior to the primary involves several
considerations. First, contributors must determine their preferred candidate. Second,
contributors must determine the likelihood their preferred candidate will win. Finally,
contributors must evaluate the closeness of the election for their preferred candidate.
The general election is the second critical time point in which contributors have to
decide if they are going to contribute. The decision to give prior to the general election
involves the same considerations for the primary. First, who is the preferred candidate,
second what is the likelihood their preferred candidate will win and by what margin.
Contributors are more likely to give to a candidate expected to win or that has a
realistic chance at winning, therefore, incumbents receive the majority of contributions
(Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie and Thompson 1998). Challengers are most likely to receive
contributions when they are facing a vulnerable incumbent, as is the case when the
incumbent may be involved in a scandal. Ethical problems do not always result in the defeat
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of the incumbent, but they are more likely to be defeated under these circumstances (Peters
and Welch 1980; Ragsdale and Cook 1987).
Incumbents in safe seats still receive a large number of campaign contributions.
Additionally, incumbents have a fundraising advantage over challengers during every stage
of the electoral cycle, thus providing evidence that contributors are providing contributions
even when the outcome of the election is certain (Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994).
The start of the legislative session is the third critical time point in understanding
patterns of contributions. The decision to give a contribution prior to or at the beginning of
the legislative session is based on several considerations. First, legal restrictions on when
contributions can be given have to be considered. If contributions are prohibited during the
legislative session, the beginning of the legislative session becomes much more important
since this is the closest possible time in which a contribution can be given prior to the
consideration of a piece of legislation. Second, it is often unclear as to the precise timing of
the consideration of legislation, hence contributors may give a contribution at the beginning
of the legislative session due to the uncertainty of when the legislation will be considered.
The fourth critical point in understanding contribution patterns is the introduction of
a bill in the legislature. The introduction of a piece of legislation is a motivating factor to
contributors with a stake in the legislation and often results in the mobilization of supporters
and opponents of the legislation. Additionally, legislators are less likely to have entrenched
positions on a piece of legislation early in the process, and consequently may be easier to
persuade at this point in the process.
In some legislatures, the leadership controls the legislative agenda, therefore,
contributions to the leadership may provide interest groups with the most efficient use of
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resources in attempting to gain influence over policy outcomes (Thielemann and Dixon
1994). This may especially be the case for groups desiring to keep legislation off the
calendar, since the leadership can kill legislation without consideration by other members. A
contribution to the leadership for desired legislation may have the benefit of placing the
issue on the agenda, however, it does not necessarily result in a positive outcome for the
legislation. The legislative process is geared toward maintaining the status quo, subsequently
interest groups may find it much easier to defeat unwanted legislation than to pass desired
legislation.
The fifth critical point in understanding contribution patterns is the consideration of
legislation in committee. Committees have a great deal of power to determine the fate of a
piece of legislation. Opponents of a piece of legislation able to garner committee support for
their position, can be successful in defeating legislation even if it enjoys majority support in
the whole legislature. The choice to contribute at this stage in the process likely depends
upon the composition of the committee and the likelihood of being able to influence the
outcome of the legislation. Additionally, contributions are likely to be targeted toward the
committee chair, whom may be in the best position to exercise influence over the legislative
process.
The power of committees varies from one state to another depending upon the rules
of that state9. The role of the committee system in the legislative process will be a major
determining factor in the decision to donate money to committee members and in particular
to the committee chair (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1991; Welch 1974). If
the committee is in the position to kill legislation, then contributors are more likely to give
money to committee members in order to achieve the desired outcome (Romer and Snyder
9

See Francis (1989) for a detailed discussion of committee power in state legislatures.
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1994; Gopoian 1984). Wright (1985) concluded that positions in the leadership and on
important committees in most cases result in large contributions. A strong committee system
with the power to kill legislation will result in more contributions directed toward committee
members prior to the consideration of legislation.
The sixth critical point in understanding contribution patterns is the floor vote on a
bill. The floor vote represents the last opportunity for contributors to impact the outcome of
legislation of concern to them. At this stage in the process, contributors can target legislators
who are setting on the fence in the effort to persuade him or her to support the position of
the contributor. Also, upon completion of the vote, contributors may reward support of their
positions.
In some legislatures the leadership controls the legislative agenda, therefore
contributions to the leadership may provide interest groups with the most efficient use of
resources in attempting to gain influence over policy outcomes (Thielemann and Dixon
1994). This may especially be the case for groups desiring to keep legislation off the
calendar since the leadership can kill legislation without consideration by other members. A
contribution to the leadership for legislation that the contributor desires may have the benefit
of placing the issue on the agenda, however, it does not necessarily result in a positive
outcome for the legislation. The legislative process is geared toward maintaining the status
quo, hence interest groups may find it much easier to defeat unwanted legislation than to
pass desired legislation.
The seventh and final critical point in understanding contributions patterns is the end
of the legislative session. The close of the legislative session is especially important in states
were legal restrictions are placed on the contributions during the legislative session. The
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close of the legislative session provides the opportunity to reward legislators for their votes
during the legislative session.

2. Particularistic Contributors
Particularistic contributors attempt to influence the outcome of legislative votes
important to them. Particularistic contributors have potential incentives to contribute at all
seven critical time points. First, particularistic contributors hope to elect individuals that are
the most likely to support their position, accordingly they have to determine if they should
contribute prior to the primary. A contributor may practice an influencing strategy by giving
a contribution prior to the primary. The purpose of the influencing strategy during the
primary is to elect the preferred candidate that is most likely to support legislation of interest
to the contributor. A contribution during the primary is more likely to occur in a competitive
election to help with the election of the preferred candidate. In addition to evaluating the
probability of electoral success of the preferred candidate during the primary, particularistic
contributors also must look forward to the probability of success in the general election. If
the probability of success during the primary is high but the likelihood of success during the
general election is low, then a contribution during the primary may be wasted since the
preferred candidate will not be in a position to influence legislative outcomes. If the election
of the preferred candidate is not in doubt, some contributors may continue to practice an
influencing strategy for future considerations. However, some contributors may choose to
employ a free rider strategy in which they do not give a contribution since the election of
their preferred candidate is assured.
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Particularistic contributors also have incentives to give contributions prior to the
general election. As with the primary, particularistic contributors may give prior to the
general election in the hope of electing the candidate most likely to be supportive of their
legislative position. Particularistic contributors have to evaluate their preferred candidate’s
probability of success in the general election in determining whether to provide an
influencing contribution prior to the election or to practice a free rider strategy.
During the primary and general elections, particularistic contributors have to
consider any legal restrictions that may prohibit them from contributing closer to an
important legislative vote. If contributions are limited during the legislative session, some
particularistic contributors may change their strategy and practice an influencing strategy
during the primary or general election. Also, contributors may desire to hide their true
motivations and therefore give a contribution during the primary or general election.
Particularistic contributors also have incentives to provide contributions prior to the
beginning of the legislative session. The probability of providing an influencing contribution
prior to the beginning of the legislative session is greater when contributions are prohibited
during the legislative session. A contributor providing an influencing contribution prior to
the beginning of the legislative session represents the closest point prior to consideration of
a piece of legislation that a contribution can be legally given. Additionally, some
particularistic contributors may give contributions prior to the beginning of the legislative
session to avoid the appearance of trying to influence legislative outcomes by giving a
contribution closer to the legislative vote.
Particularistic contributors have incentives to give contributions prior to the
introduction of a bill of concern to the contributor, which is the fourth critical time point in
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understanding contribution patterns. Particularistic contributors may give an influencing
contribution prior to the introduction of the legislation in order to persuade the legislator to
support his or her position. If the contributor believes a favorable outcome on the legislation
is likely, he or she may choose to free ride since the contribution is not needed to achieve the
desired outcome.
Particularistic contributors also have an incentive to provide a contribution when a
piece of legislation of concern is being considered in committee. Contributions to committee
members, and especially to the chair of the committee, may be one of the most cost efficient
means of achieving a desired outcome. Contributors have to weigh the probability of
achieving the desired outcome in their decision to provide a contribution. If a positive
outcome is highly likely, then a contributor may be more likely to employ a free rider
strategy. Furthermore, in states that prohibit contributions during legislative sessions
contributors have to employ an alternative strategy to influence the legislative outcome.
Contributions to persuade committee members may be especially important when the defeat
of a piece of legislation is the desired outcome. Committees can often kill legislation without
it ever reaching the floor, therefore making an influencing contribution is especially
important on legislation with majority support in the legislature.
The floor vote on a bill of interest is the sixth critical time point in understanding
contribution patterns. Contributors may choose to employ a variety of strategies based on
the probability of success or for future success. A contributor may give an influencing
contribution prior to the floor vote in the hope of influencing the outcome of the vote. A
contributor may choose to practice a reward strategy were they give a contribution after a
vote to a supportive legislator. Additionally, some contributors may choose to practice an
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influencing reward strategy were they give a contribution before and after a positive vote by
the legislator. This type of strategy reinforces the positive vote and serves as a motivation to
the legislator to support the contributor in the future.
Contributors may choose to give contributions to legislators even when they fail to
support their position. These types of strategies, while not as common, may occur under
some circumstances. A contributor practicing a future influencing strategy provides a
contribution following a negative in the hope of influencing future votes in the legislature.
Additionally, the contributor may have received a signal that future support is likely though
it may not have been possible on this vote for political reasons.
Following a negative vote, a contributor who was planning to reward the legislator
for a positive vote withholds the contribution following a negative vote as a punishment for
failure to support the contributor’s position. Additionally, a contributor who provided a
contribution prior to a negative vote and was planning on rewarding a contributor after a
positive vote practices and influencing punishment strategy by withholding a contribution
following a negative vote. Finally, although not that likely some contributors may give
contributions before and after a negative vote thus practicing an influencing/future
influencing strategy. This type of strategy is most likely to occur when the contributor is
highly certain that support will be forthcoming on future legislation.
Some particularistic contributors also have incentives to provide, or fail to provide, a
contribution at the end of the legislative session, which is our final critical time point in
understanding contribution patterns. The end of the session is especially important in states
were contributions are prohibited during the legislative session, since the end of the session
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provides contributors with the opportunity to reward positive votes during the legislative
session or to punish negative votes during the session by not providing a contribution.

2.1. Summary of Particularistic Strategies
Particularistic contributors have incentives to provide contributions at all seven
critical time points. At the first five time points, particularistic contributors can choose to
make an influencing contribution or to free ride. Contributors have a variety of different
strategies to employ before and after a floor vote on a bill. Contributors may attempt to
influence not only the current bill under consideration but future legislation of interest to the
contributor. Additionally, some particularistic contributors may choose to punish nonsupportive legislators. The choice of strategies is dependent upon a variety of factors
including legal restrictions and the amount of resources available to the contributor.

3. Universalistic contributors
Universalistic contributors are motivated by election considerations and therefore
respond differently to the seven critical time points in understanding contribution patterns.
Universalistic contributors are only concerned about the primary and the general election
and are not motivated to contribute at the final five critical time points. Universalistic
contributors provide contributions to influence the outcome of the primary or general
election or they may choose to free ride. The probability of their preferred candidate’s
electoral success is a primary consideration in determining whether to give a contribution.

78

4. Summary of contribution patterns.
Particularistic and universalistic contributors have incentives to contribute at both the
general election and primary election. Given that both types of contributors have incentives
to give prior to the primary and general elections, it is not possible to determine if
contributions given prior to the primary and general election are particularistic or
universalistic. However, only particularistic contributions are expected in close proximity to
the other five critical time points. It is expected that the greatest increase in contributions
will occur prior to the election since all contributors have an incentive to give prior to the
election.
In summary contributors follow one of eight strategies when deciding when to
provide contributions. Universalistic contributors in general practice an influencing strategy
or a free rider strategy. Particularistic contributors, however, may practice any one of the
eight possible strategies Different strategies will be employed with different legislators at
different times; therefore, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. The eight possible
contributor strategies are summarized as follows:
Influencing Strategy – contribution given prior to major vote.
Influencing Reward Strategy – contribution given prior to and after a positive vote.
Reward Strategy – contribution given following a positive vote.
Free Rider Strategy – contributions given neither before nor after a positive vote.
Influencing Punishment Strategy – contribution given prior to but not after a
negative vote.
Punishment Strategy – contribution withheld following a negative vote.
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Influencing/Future Influencing Strategy - contribution given before and after a
negative vote.
Future Influencing Strategy - contribution given following a negative vote.

5. Hypotheses
The first hypothesis for this study is that the proximity to the general election will be
the best predictor of campaign contributions. As discussed previously, PACs have to make
decisions at the various stages of the political process as to whether they should contributor
or not. Universalistic contributors will always contribute close to the election unless they are
employing a free rider strategy, because they expect their preferred candidate to win the
election easily. In addition to the universalistic contributors, particularistic contributors also
have to make a decision if they should contribute close to the election. Particularistic
contributors may choose to give a contribution close to the election if they believe their
preferred candidate is in jeopardy of being defeated in the election or in the effort to
influence future legislative vote outcomes. Therefore, the general election is expected to be
the best predictor of campaign contribution because both universalistic and particularistic
contributors are expected to give contributions close to the election.
The second hypothesis in this study is that proximity to an important legislative vote
increases the number of contributions given. Additionally, it is expected that contributions
will increase during the legislative session, thereby providing further evidence that
contributions are being given with the hope of influencing the outcome of an important
legislative vote. It is expected that the proximity to an important legislative vote is
significant in explaining campaign contributions. However, the increase in contributions is
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not expected to be as great as the increase surrounding the election. Furthermore,
particularistic voters are also giving contributions during the election period, thereby
overestimating the number of contributions given with the sole hope of influencing the
outcome of the election.
Some states such as Utah and New Mexico limit campaign contributions during the
legislative session, thereby diminishing the opportunity to give a contribution in close
proximity to an important legislative vote. A session limit does not eliminate the opportunity
to give contributions in close to the legislative vote if the vote occurs close to the beginning
or end of the legislative session, however, it does make it more difficult to give contributions
close to an important legislative vote. Furthermore, the implementation of a session limit
may discourage the giving of a contribution as it increases the distance between the time the
contribution is given and the vote in the legislature occurs, thus making the contribution less
effective in influencing the legislative outcome.
The third hypothesis in this study is that the increase in the number of contributions
surrounding the general election will be greater in states with limits during legislative
sessions than in states with no such limits. It is expected that particularistic contributors
attempt to gain undue influence in the legislative process by getting those individuals most
likely to support the contributor’s position elected. Additionally, contributions may be given
during the election season in the attempt to influence future legislative outcomes or to
reward past behavior. When particularistic contributors are confronted with session limits on
contributions, the number of opportunities to give contributions is diminished, thereby
increasing the probability of giving a contribution prior to the election.
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The fourth hypothesis in this study is that an increase in contributions will occur
prior to the beginning of the session in states with session limits on contributions. The
rationale for this hypothesis is that due to the legal restrictions placed on contributions
during the legislative session, particularistic contributors will shift their contributions to
prior to the beginning of the legislative session in order to influence votes during the
legislative session. When faced with a session limit, it is expected the contributor will
attempt to minimize the amount of time between the time the contribution is give and the
vote of an important piece of legislation, hence it is reasonable to assume that particularistic
contributors will give contributions prior to the beginning of the legislative session in the
effort to minimize the amount of time between the contribution and the vote in the
legislature.
The fifth hypothesis for this study is that an increase in contributions will occur
immediately after the end of the session in states with limits on session contributions. It is
expected that in states where contributors are prohibited to give contributions during a
legislative session that particularistic contributors will shift their contributions to
immediately following the session as a reward for supporting the contributor during the
legislative session. In some cases, particularistic contributors may not anticipate legislation
upcoming during a legislative session and therefore may attempt to persuade a legislator to
support their position during the legislative session in turn for the promise of a contribution
when the legal restrictions are no longer in affect. Additionally, a particularistic contributor
may give a contribution at the end of the session to think the member for their support
during the session and to influence votes they may come up in the future.
In summary, this dissertation will address the following five hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: The proximity to the general election will be the best predictor of
campaign contributions.
Hypothesis 2: The proximity to an important legislative vote increases the number
of contributions given.
Hypothesis 3: The increase in the number of contributions surrounding the
general election will be greater in states with limits during
legislative sessions than in states with no such limits.
Hypothesis 4: Contributions will increase prior to the beginning of the session in
states with session limits on contributions
Hypothesis 5: Contributions will increase immediately after the end of the session
in states with limits on contributions given during legislative
sessions

6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the motivations and strategies employed by political
action committees and other contributors in deciding if and when to give a campaign
contribution. Particularistic contributors are attempting to influence elections, so in turn they
are in a better position to influence policy outcomes. It is not possible to determine what
percentage of the contributions given close to the general and primary elections are
particularistic, since universalistic and particularistic contributors both have an incentive to
give contributions close to the election. This results in an underestimation of the number of
particularistic contributors, since some particularistic contributors are giving prior to the
election. Therefore, evidence of interest group activity to influence legislative outcomes is
likely to underestimate the full extent of the particularistic motives of contributors. Given
the fact that particularistic contributions are likely to be underestimated, evidence of
particularistic contributions will provide greater confidence that contributors are trying to
exercise undue influence on legislative outcomes.
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The campaign finance literature has addressed a wide array of issues in the campaign
finance system. However, little research has addressed many of the same important
questions at the state level. This research will address the argument between particularistic
and universalistic contributors by expanding previous research to the state level. Through
this research, a greater understanding will be provided as to the motivations behind
campaign contributions. Through an examination of the timing of contributions at the
federal level Stratmann (1992, 1998, 2000) finds that major votes are better indicators of
campaign contributions than the proximity to the election. Through an examination of states,
we gain a better understanding of how legislative structure and context influences
contribution decisions.
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Chapter 5: Data and Model of Legislative Contributions
In the previous chapter I discussed two primary motivations of campaign
contributions and how these motives structure the decision of when or if to provide a
contribution. The timing of campaign contributions is conditioned on the motivation of the
contributor and the legal framework for contributions in that state. As previously illustrated,
contributors provide contributions to candidates with two primary motivations. First, some
contributors are attempting to influence the outcome of elections. Second, contributors are
attempting to influence the outcome of legislation. It is expected that the greatest increase in
contributions will occur close to the election, however, proximity to a major legislative vote
is also expected to be significant in explaining contribution patterns in state legislatures. In
this chapter I identify the twenty-five bills that are examined. For each bill, I determine if
contributions increased while the bill was under consideration by the legislature.
Furthermore, in this chapter I establish a model to explain contribution patterns in state
legislatures and shed some light on the motivation of contributors.
The model established in this chapter analyzes the pattern of contributions
surrounding six important events. It is expected that the number of contributions increases
the closer the proximity to the primary or general election. Additionally, it is expected that
contributions increase when legislation of concern to a political action committee is under
consideration. However, the actions of contributors are expected to be adapted to address
legal restrictions faced by the political action committee. For example, it is expected that
contributions prior to the beginning of the legislative session will be greater in states that
prohibit contributions during the session. Furthermore, it is expected that contributions will
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increase following the legislative session in states that prohibit contributions during the
legislative session.

1. Model of campaign contributions
A contributor fixed effects model is used to test for increased or decreased levels of
contributions for each contributor. The dependent variable is the number of contributions
given by a political action committee during the course of a week. The model is estimated
using a Negative Binomial regression in which the dependent variable indicates the number
of contributions given by each contributor during each week included in the analysis.
Each political action committee has a count of the number of contributions given for
each week included in the two-year analysis; hence there are 104 different measurements of
the dependent variable that consist of the number of contributions given by each PAC during
each week. For example, if during week three a PAC gave three contributions, then the
dependent variable is coded as 3. If they did not contribute during that week then the
dependent variable would be coded as 0. A negative binomial estimation technique will be
employed to estimate the model given the fact that the Poisson method assumes that the
mean and the variance are equal and can provide bias estimations in cases of over
dispersion.
Six explanatory variables are included in the model to determine the impact of the
primary election, general election, and legislative vote event on contribution patterns. The
primary election variable is coded as 1 for each week during the two months prior to the
primary and 0 for all other weeks. It is expected that contributions will increase during the
two months leading up to the primary. Second, the model includes a general election
variable coded as 1 for each week during the two months prior to the election and 0 during
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all other weeks. Third, the vote event variable is coded as 1 from three weeks prior to the
legislation being reported out of committee to three weeks following the floor vote. This
specification takes into account that some contributors will give contributions after a vote to
reward the member for a positive vote. Additionally, the vote event variable will only be
included in the model in states in which it is legal to give contributions during the legislative
session. Forth, the model includes a variable for the legislative session. The session variable
is coded as 1 if the legislature is in session and as 0 if the legislature is not in session.
Campaign contributions are expected to increase during the legislative session unless
prohibited by law. PACs attempting to influence legislative outcomes become more active.
A variable for the beginning of the legislative session is also included in the model. The
variable is coded as 1 for the two weeks prior to the beginning of the legislative session and
as 0 during all other weeks. It is expected that contributions will increase prior to the
beginning of the legislative session in an effort to influence legislation considered during the
session. Furthermore, interest group activity prior to the beginning of the legislative session
is expected to be especially active in states in which contributions are prohibited during the
session. Inclusion of the beginning of the session variable in the model allows for a
determination of the strategies employed by PACs. It is important to understand the
strategies of contributors in order to reform the current system to lessen the undue influence
of money in the political system. In addition to determining if interest groups are engaging
in influencing behavior a variable for the end of session is included in the model to
determine if interest groups are practicing a reward strategy. It is expected that PACs will
provide contributions at the end of the legislative session in order to reward the behavior of
legislators during the legislative session. Reward before is expected to be most prevalent in
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states that do not allow contributions following the legislative session. The end of session
variable is coded as a 1 for the two weeks following the end of the legislative session as 0
during all other weeks.
In summary, the dependent variable for this study is the number of contributions
given by a political action committee to legislators in a week and the independent variables
are proximity to the primary, proximity to the general election, proximity to a legislative
vote, legislative session, beginning of the legislative session, and end of legislative session.
The baseline for the model is all other weeks that are not part of the general election,
primary, session, beginning of session, end of session and vote event variables. Positive
coefficients indicate that contributions increased during that period in comparison to the
baseline period when we hold all of the other variables constant. Conversely, a negative
coefficient indicates that contributions decreased in comparison to the baseline period when
we hold all other variables constant.
The baseline period varies from one state to the next10. In New York, for example,
the baseline period only consists of 9 weeks during the two-year period. New York is any
session nearly year round, therefore, there are only a few weeks in the sample that are not
part of the primary election, general election of the legislative session. On the other hand, in
Utah the baseline consists of 65 weeks. Contributions occur at all times during the course of
the year including the baseline period. In many cases, the baseline period provides the best
opportunity for legislators to engage in fundraising since they are not concerned with the
business of the legislature or with campaigning.

10

The baseline period consist of 20 weeks in California, 57 weeks in Georgia, 33 weeks in Illinois, 49 weeks in
Kentucky, 54 weeks in New Mexico, 9 weeks in New York, 44 weeks in South Carolina, 65 weeks in Utah and
13 weeks in Wisconsin.
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This model will allow for a determination of the strategies employed by interest
groups in attempting to influence legislation, and how strategies change with session limits.
Furthermore, the analysis provides insight on the effectiveness of session limits in removing
the undue influence of money from the political process, and the direction for future
reforms. For a summary of the model of legislative contributions, please see table 5.0.
TABLE 5.0. ABOUT HERE
2. Contribution data
The contribution data for this study is obtained from the National Institute on Money
in State Politics11 web site www.followthemoney.org. The institute provides data on who
contributes money, the amount of the contribution, and the date of the contribution.
Additionally, contributors are coded by their sector of the economy. 12 The contributors
selected for the analysis of each bill will consist of interest groups with a direct interest in
the legislation under consideration. For example, interest groups with an interest in health
care will be included in the analysis on a health care bill.
The National Institute of Money in State Politics provides a broad classification of
interest groups. Interest groups are selected for each analysis based on those sectors of the
economy that appeared to be most relevant to the piece of legislation. For minimum wage
legislation, it was assumed that labor groups and business groups would have an invested
interest in the legislation, therefore, groups for the labor and general business sector as
classified by the National Institute of Money in State Politics are included in the analysis for

11

The National Institute on Money in State Politics describes itself as “a nonpartisan, nonprofit program
dedicated to accurate, comprehensive and unbiased documentation and research on campaign finance at the
state level”.
12

For additional information of the coding scheme used by the National Institute on Money in State Politics
please see their web site at http://www.followthemoney.org/database/coding.html.
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minimum wage legislation. These same sectors would also have an interest in workers
compensation legislation. The broad classification of contributors by the National Institute
of Money in State Politics creates the problem that interest groups not interested in
influencing the outcome of a legislative vote may be included in the analysis. However, the
inclusion of groups that may not be interested in the outcome of the legislation results in a
greater likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between
contribution activities and legislative votes. Given the increased likelihood of accepting the
null hypothesis, we can have greater confidence in positive findings that a relationship does
exist between contributions and legislative votes.

3. States selected for this study
The full sample of states includes: California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, New
Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. Of these nine states, four allow
campaign contributions during a legislative session while five states do not allow campaign
contributions during the session. The states also vary on whether they allow corporations to
give contributions directly to candidates. Illinois, Utah, and New Mexico allow corporations
to give unlimited contributions to candidates. This provision in the campaign finance law
results in the need for fewer political action committees, thus making the contributions of
political committees not as significant in those states. Kentucky and Wisconsin, prohibit
corporations from giving contributions to candidates, while in the other four states
contributions by corporations are allowed, but limits are placed on the amount of the
contributions.
The nine states included in the study represent a cross section of the nation
geographically with California from the west, New York from the northeast, Georgia in the
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south, and Illinois in the Midwest. Furthermore, the sample includes states from a wide
variety of professionalism levels. California and New York have highly professional
legislatures meeting year around, while Kentucky and New Mexico have amateur
legislatures. In addition to the variation of the sample across different levels of
professionalism, the sample also includes states with a wide variety of different legal
restrictions placed on the actions of contributors. For example, Georgia bans contributions
during legislative sessions while California allows contributions during the session.
The variation of contribution restrictions across states provides the opportunity to
examine the impact of such restrictions. It is expected that political action committee
contributions will not be as significant in those states that allow unlimited contributions by
corporations. In states with unlimited contributions allowed by corporations, the need to
form a political committee is not as critical to provide contributions to try, and influence
vote outcomes.
Additionally, the sample chosen for this study allows us to examine the impact of
session restrictions on contributions. It is expected that when an interest group encounters a
session ban on contributions, they will change their strategy. Instead of giving a contribution
prior to a legislative vote in order to influence a vote outcome or following a legislative vote
as a reward, contributors may shift those contributions to immediately prior to a legislative
session to influence behavior during the legislative session or following the legislative
session as a reward for a vote that occurred during the session. In addition to this when faced
with a session limit, interest groups may shift their focus to the primary or general election.
Hence, it is expected in states with limits on session contributions the proximity to the
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general or primary election will play a more significant role in explaining contribution
patterns.

4. Legislation to be examined
In this section, I provide an overview of the twenty-five pieces of legislation in nine
different states examined in this study. For each of these twenty-five bills, I determined if a
significant increase in the number of contributions occurred, surrounding the elections as
well as surrounding the bill itself. There are two primary criteria in selecting the legislation
examined in this study. First, the bills selected are from a diversity of states both from a
geographical perspective as well as from a legislative professionalism perspective. Second,
the states selected represent a diversity of campaign finance laws. In particular, states
included both allow and prohibit campaign contributions during legislative sessions. This
study examines twenty-five bills in nine states. These bills cover a range of different issues
including health care, the minimum wage, workers compensation and so forth (for a
summary of the legislation please see Table 5.1).
TABLE 5.1. ABOUT HERE
The twenty-five bills in this study are across the nine states from the 2001 and 2002
legislative session. Legislation in this study is from bills selected by the National Federation
of Independent Businesses for inclusion in their rating scores of state legislators. While
these scores do not include all significant legislation considered during the session, they
include a wide variety of issues including but not limited to health care, tax policy,
environmental policy, education policy and so forth, thus making the bills representative of
the most important legislation considered by the legislature. The selection of bills from the
ratings by the National Federation of Independent Businesses allows easy identification of
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the most important pieces of legislation considered during the legislative session and the
ones most likely to attract interest group activity. The NFIB is concerned with a wide variety
of political issues making these rating scores a good indicator of the most important
legislation considered during the session. Bills in this study include those on some aspect of
health care in eight states and concerning the minimum wage for seven states thus providing
common issues across the majority of the states in the sample. Information on legislation
action is from LexisNexis State Capital Universe.13 LexisNexis provides a database on the
progress of bills through the legislative process. This database provides information as to
when legislation was introduced, committee action occurred, and floor action occurred.
Three bills in the study are from the California Senate. The first bill is SB 604
concerning health care. This bill creates the Health and Wellness Promotion Advisory Board
in the Department of Managed Care to advice the Legislature on medical testing and
services appropriate for the health promotion program. Furthermore, the legislation requires
every health plan and disability insure to provide certain tests and services to its subscribers
with limited deductibles and co-payments. The bill faced opposition by insurance
companies, but eventually passed the senate. However, the legislation encountered
opposition in the House and failed to become law.
The second bill examined in California is Assembly Bill 2242, which adjusts the
hourly minimum wage on January 1, 2003 and annually using the State Consumer Price
Index. Additionally, the legislation provides that the Industrial Welfare Commission may
not increase the minimum wage in 2003 and cannot review the minimum wage again until
2013. The bill passed the assembly, however, was unable to get out of the Senate and
therefore did not become law.
13

http://web.lexis-nexis.com/stcapuniv/
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The third bill examined in California is Senate Bill 71which authorizes the use of
civil penalties for use in combating Worker’s compensation fraud. Additionally, the
legislation eliminates the requirement that occupational safety and health loss control
consultation services be certified by the Director of Industrial Relations and requires the
director to levy and collect fees form Worker’s compensation insurers for safety programs.
The legislation passed both the Assembly and the Senate, however, the governor vetoed the
legislation on October 14, 2001.
I also examine three bills in Georgia. The first bill examined in Georgia was H.B.
1568, the Natural Gas Consumer’s Relief Act, relates to the Public Service Commission.
The act expands the powers of the commission by allowing them to seek injunctions when
appropriate, and amends portions of the Natural Gas and Deregulation Act and helps in
providing assistance to low-income residential customers. The legislation passed both
Houses of the legislature and the governor signed it into law on April 25, 2002.
The second piece of legislation examined in Georgia is House Bill 1492, which
changes provisions of the insurance coverage for equipment and self-management training
for individuals with diabetes and provides provisions for enforcement. The legislation
relates to major medical group health insurance policy, group insurance plan policy and
other types of managed or capitated care plans or policies. The legislation passed both
chambers of the legislature and was signed by the governor on May 9, 2002,
The third piece of legislation examined in Georgia Senate Bill 14which provides for
an increase in the Georgia minimum wage law. Additionally, the law provides for changes
relative to the federal minimum wage. The law passed both houses of the general assembly
and was signed into law by the governor.
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I also consider three bills in Illinois. The first piece of legislation examined in Illinois
is House Bill 2487 that creates the Illinois Family and Medical Leave Act. The act, with a
few exceptions, provides for provisions similar to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993. The act passed the House but died in the Senate Rules committee. The second bill
analyzed in Illinois is House Bill 4540, which amends the minimum wage law. The bill
passed the House but failed to pass the Senate. The third bill examined in Illinois was Senate
Bill 1341, which requires insurance coverage for serious mental illnesses to be provided on
the same terms and conditions as are applicable to other illnesses and diseases. The bill
pertains to insurance coverage provided under group insurance policies. The bill passed both
houses of the legislature, and was signed by the governor on July 27, 2001.
I investigate two bills in the Kentucky House, both of which deal with black lung
benefits for coal miners. House Bill 132 modifies the requirement that administrative law
judges give “presumptive weight” to the findings of evaluators in coal worker’s
pneumoconiosis claims. The legislation requires that employers give notice of denial or
acceptance of a claim within 30 days of the commissioner issuing a notice of consensus
reading and provides other procedures for claim procedures. House Bill 132 passed the
House but failed to pass the Senate.
Kentucky House Bill 348, introduced in 2002, is a revision of House Bill 132,
considered in 2001. The bill requires that employers give notice of denial or acceptance of a
claim, however, the legislation does not mandate a 30-day time limit as the previous version
did. Additionally, House Bill 348 permits miners 57 years of age and older to receive
income benefits for 425 weeks in lieu of training and education and requires referral to the
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Department of Vocational Rehabilitation for assessment and services. House Bill 348 passed
both houses of the legislature and was signed into law by the governor on April 13, 2002.
I examine three bills in New Mexico. The first bill examined is the Employee
Protection Act. House Bill 62 prohibits employer retaliatory actions against employees in
certain circumstances and provides for grievance procedures and penalties. The legislation
failed to pass the House and the Senate did not consider the legislation.
The second piece of legislation examined is Senate Bill 439, which relates to the
Minimum Healthcare Protection Act. The legislation provides group health insurance for
smaller groups and provides for managed care. The legislation passed the Senate but failed
to pass the House. The final bill examined in New Mexico is House Joint Resolution 8,
which requires that the state minimum wage be at least equal to the minimum wage
established by Federal Law. The legislation passed the House but failed to pass the Senate.
I investigate three bills in New York, with one bill analyzed in both the Assembly
and the Senate. Assembly Bill 11723, which requires the provision of coverage by health
insurers of certain women’s health care and preventive care service, is examined in both
chambers of the legislature. The legislation requires coverage of mammography screening
and cervical cytology screening for those employed in more than one state. Furthermore, the
legislation expands the frequency of mammography screening, coverage for contraceptive
drugs and devices, and directs the superintendent of insurance to conduct a study. The
legislation passed both chambers of the legislature and the governor signed it into law.
The second piece of legislation examined in New York is Assembly Bill 5132, which
raises the state minimum wage and provides that annually such statutory wage shall be
increased. The legislation faced opposition from Republicans and failed to pass the
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Republican-controlled Senate after passing the Assembly. The final bill to be examined in
New York is Assembly Bill 11624, which extends the Unemployment Benefits Act of 2002.
The legislation passed the Assembly but failed to pass the Senate.
I examined three bills in South Carolina. The first bill establishes a task force to
conduct a comprehensive review of health insurance mandates and to provide a report to the
General Assembly. House Bill 4583 passed both the House and Senate and the governor
signed the bill into law on July 1, 2002. The second bill examined in South Carolina is
House Bill 3289, which prohibits a subdivision of the state from establishing, mandating, or
requiring a minimum wage that exceeds the federal minimum wage. The legislation passed
both the House and Senate and became law without the governor singing the legislation.
The final bill examined in South Carolina is House Bill 3142, which requires the
directors of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to ensure compliance with
the provisions concerning the right to work. The legislation prohibits an employer from
requiring or prohibiting membership in a labor organization as a condition for employment.
House Bill 342 passed both the House and the Senate and was signed by the governor on
July 26, 2002.
I investigate three bills in Utah. House Bill 105 modifies the insurance code to create
a pilot program which requires accident and health insurance plans offered on a group basis
to state employees to adopt health insurance mandates proposed for other accident and
health insurance plans for one year and to report the cost and benefits of the mandate to the
Commissioner of Insurance. The legislation passed both houses of the legislature and was
signed into law by the governor on March 26, 2002.
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The second bill examined in Utah is House Bill 238, which modifies the Cigarette
and Tobacco Tax Licensing Act. The act increased the tax levied on cigarettes and specifies
that a portion of the revenue raised would go toward prevention programs and another
portion would go toward cancer research and medical education.
The third bill examined in Utah is Senate Bill 138, which modifies the minimum
wage law to prohibit cities, towns, and counties from establishing a minimum wage that is
greater than the federal minimum wage. The law passed both chambers of the legislature and
the governor signed it into law on March 19, 2001.
Finally, I examine one bill in Wisconsin, which makes changes to the Worker’s
Compensation Law relating to liability for disability caused by unnecessary treatment.
Senate Bill 252 also addresses maximum compensation amounts, methods of calculating
compensation, vocational rehabilitation, offers of suitable employment, payment of benefits,
and program administration. The bill passed both chambers of the legislature and was signed
into law by the governor on December 17, 2001.

5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced a model of legislative contributions that will be
tested using a negative binomial regression. It is expected that campaign contributions will
increase close to the primary and general elections as well as close to the time when a piece
of legislation of interest to the political action committee is under consideration, however,
the actions of contributors are constrained by various campaign finance laws which I
discussed in this chapter. I examine the pattern of contributions surrounding twenty-five
pieces of legislation in nine states. From an analysis of the twenty-five pieces of legislation,
we will be able to determine if elections are the most important factor in explaining
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campaign contributions in the states. Additionally, while the model set forth in this chapter
will not allow us to determine the full extent of the number of particularistic contributors it
will allow us to determine if some contributors are attempting to influence the outcome of
legislative votes. Given the fact that the model presented in this chapter will tend to
underestimate the number of particularistic contributors, we can have greater confidence in
findings that reveal interest groups that are attempting to influence the outcome of
legislative votes. Through the testing of this model we will gain some insight on the actions
of contributors and if they are attempting to gain undue influence in the legislative process.

Copyright ©David W. Prince 2006
99

Table 5.0. Model of Legislative Contributions
Dependent Variable
Number of Contributions

Independent Variable

General Election

Independent Variable

Primary Election

Independent Variable
(Included in models for
states that allow
contributions during the
legislative session)
Independent Variable

Legislative Vote Event

Independent Variable

Beginning of Session

Independent Variable

End of Session

Legislative Session

100

Count of the number of
campaign contributions
given by each contributor
each week.
Coded 1 in each of the eight
weeks prior to the general
election and during election
week and coded as 0 in all
other weeks.
Coded 1 in each of the eight
weeks prior to the primary
election and during primary
week and coded as 0 in all
other weeks.
Coded 1 from three weeks
prior to the legislation being
reported out of committee
to three weeks following the
floor vote.
Coded 1 for each week the
legislature is in session and
coded 0 in all other weeks.
Coded 1 for each of the two
weeks prior to the
beginning of the legislative
session and coded 0 in all
other weeks
Coded 1 for each of the two
weeks following the end of
the legislative session and
coded 0 in all other weeks
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H.B.
1568

H.B.
1492

S.B. 14

Georgia

Georgia

Georgia

S.B. 71

California

1/8/2002

2/20/2002

2/26/2002

1/9/2001

2/20/2002

2/22/2001

S.B. 604

A.B.
2242

Introduced

Bill

California

California

State

Table 5. 1. Legislation Examined

Increase the
minimum wage

Insurance
Coverage for
Equipment and
selfmanagement
training for
individuals
with diabetes
and
enforcement

Natural Gas
Consumer’s
Relief Act

Worker’s
Compensation
Fraud

Minimum
Wage

Health Care
and Insurance

Subject

Judiciary

Insurance

Finance and
Public
Utilities

Labor and
Industrial
Relations
Labor and
Industrial
Relations

Insurance

Committee

3/8/2001

3/19/2002

4/3/2002

5/9/2001

6/26/2002

4/18/2001

Out of
Committee

3/13/2001

3/26/2002

4/9/2002

5/14/2001

6/4/2001

Floor Vote

Yes

No

No

No

Session
Limit

Passed
House and
Signed by
Governor

Yes

Passed
Yes
House and
Signed by the
Governor

Passed
Senate and
Signed By
Governor

Passed
Senate and
Vetoed By
the Governor

Failed to
Pass Senate

Passed
Senate

Outcome
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H.B. 132

H.B. 348

Kentucky

Kentucky

H.B.
4540

Illinois

S.B.
1341

H.B.
2487

Illinois

Illinois

Bill

State

1/15/2002

1/5/2001

2/22/2001

2/4/2002

2/23/2001

Introduced

Worker’s
Compensati
on Black
Lung

Black Lung

Requires
Insurance
Coverage
for mental
illnesses

Amends the
minimum
wage law

Creates the
Illinois
Family and
Medical
Leave Act

Subject

Table 5. 1. Legislation Examined (Continued)

Labor and
Industry

Labor and
Industry

Health Care
Availability
and Access

Labor

Labor

Committee

1/22/2002

2/21/2001

4/25/2001

3/20/2002

3/15/2001

Out of
Committee

1/28/2002

2/27/2001

5/2/2001

4/3/2002

3/30/2001

Floor
Vote

Passed House
and Senate and
Signed by the
Governor

Passed House
Died in
Committee in
Senate

Passed House
and Senate and
signed into law
by the governor

Passed House
and died in the
Senate

Passed House
and died in the
Senate

Outcome

No

No

No

No

No

Session
Limit
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A.B.
11723

A.B.
11723
(House)

New York

New York

S.B. 439

New
Mexico

H.J.R 8

H.B. 62

New
Mexico

New
Mexico

Bill

State

6/14/2002

6/14/2002

1/17/2002

2/5/2001

1/18/2001

Introduced

Requires
insures to
provide for
preventive care
services for
women

Requires
insures to
provide for
preventive care
services for
women

Makes state
minimum wage
at least equal to
federal
minimum wage

Minimum
Healthcare
Protection Act

Employee
Protection Act

Subject

Table 5. 1. Legislation Examined (Continued)

Insurance

Rules

Labor and
Human
Resources

Public Affairs;
Corporations
and
Transportation

Labor and
Human
Resources

Committee

6/17/2002

6/17/2002

1/30/2002

2/27/2001
and
3/1/2001

2/12/2001

Out of
Committee

6/17/2002

6/17/2002

2/7/2002

3/5/2001

2/14/2001

Floor
Vote

Passed
House and
Senate and
Signed By
the Governor

Passed
Senate and
House
Signed By
Governor

Passed house
but failed in
Senate

Passed
Senate but
Failed to
Pass House

Failed to
Pass House

Outcome

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Session
Limit

104

H.B.
3289

H.B.
3142

South
Carolina

South
Carolina

A.B.
5132

New York

H.B.
4583

A.B.
11624

New York

South
Carolina

Bill

State

1/9/2001

1/18/2002

1/24/2002

2/20/2001

6/10/2002

Introduced

Ensuring the
Right to Work

Restriction on
minimum wage
higher than the
federal
minimum wage

Establish
Health
Insurance
Mandates Task
Force

Raises State
Minimum
Wage

Extended
Unemployment
Benefits Act

Subject

Table 5. 1. Legislation Examined (Continued)

Labor,
Commerce
and Industry

Labor,
Commerce
and Industry

Labor,
Commerce
and Industry

Labor

Labor

Committee

1/31/2001

1/31/2001

3/7/2002

2/27/2001

6/12/2002

Out of
Committee

2/15/2001

2/21/2002

3/21/2002

3/19/2001

6/17/2002

Floor Vote

Passed House
and Senate and
Signed By the
Governor

Passed House
and Senate and
Became Law
without the
Governor’s
Signature
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Chapter 6: The Pattern of Campaign Contributions

The findings in this study provide support for four out of the five hypotheses
discussed in chapter four. The general election is consistently the most important factor in
explaining campaign contribution patterns in state legislatures. However, the results also
support hypothesis two that contributors are also attempting to influence legislative
outcomes. Additionally, it appears PACs are more likely to provide contributions prior to the
legislative session as an attempt to influence the session than as a reward following the
conclusion of the legislative session. Influencing behavior is especially prevalent in states
prohibiting contributions during the legislative session. Reward behavior occurred only in
highly professional states that allow contributions during the legislative session. These
findings taken collectively paint a picture of an interest group behaving in a strategic manner
with the belief they can influence the outcome of important legislative votes. First, it is
critical to elect supportive legislators, hence political action committees are targeting
elections to elect their preferred candidate. Second, interest groups are targeting important
legislation believing they can influence the outcome of important legislative votes. Finally,
when faced with legal restrictions, such as bans on contributions during the legislative
session, interest groups employ alternative strategies such as providing contributions prior to
the beginning of the legislative session
In this chapter I first examine the pattern of campaign contributions surrounding
general and primary elections. Second, I examine the pattern of campaign contributions
surrounding legislative votes important to the contributor. Third, I examine the impact of
session limits on campaign contribution patterns. Finally, I provide insight into the
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relationship between contribution patterns and legislative professionalism. These findings
allow for a better understanding of the behavior of interest groups and an understanding of
the impact of campaign finance regulations.

1. The Impact of Elections on Campaign Contributions
The general election and the primary election was a significant and positive factor in
increasing campaign contributions in all states in the sample. These findings reveal that
contributions increase in the two months prior to the election and some PACs are likely
attempting to influence election outcomes. The motivation behind these contributions is not
clear, however, since universalistic and particularistic contributors have incentives to give
contributions prior to the election.
The general election saw on average a 514% increase in contributions with respect to
the baseline across the entire sample and the primary election saw on average a 308%
increase in campaign contributions (see table 6.0.). Additionally, the general election was
the largest factor explaining contributions in six out of the nine states included in the sample
with the primary being the largest factor in explaining the increase of contributions in
Illinois, and South Carolina and the beginning of the legislative session being the most
important factor in California. These findings provide support for hypothesis one, that the
general election is the most important factor in explaining campaign contributions.
However, it does not diminish the fact that legislation still plays a key role in understanding
contribution patterns in state legislatures. Furthermore, it is expected that a portion of the
increase in campaign contributions surrounding the election can be contributed to an overall
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particularistic strategy by political action committees who are trying to increase the
likelihood of election of a preferred candidate.
TABLE 6.0. ABOUT HERE
The greatest increase of campaign contributions surrounding the general election
occurred in New Mexico, with an average increase in contributions with respect to the
baseline of 1554% across the two significant pieces of legislation. In Utah there was an
average increase of 924% across the three significant pieces of legislation. These two states
have similar campaign finance laws, including the prohibition of contributions during
legislative sessions. The similarity of these two states in terms of legislative professionalism,
campaign finance laws, and the high increase in contributions surrounding the general
election provides evidence that the behavior of PACs is structured by the institution in
which they operate.

2. The Impact of Legislative Votes on Contribution Patterns
While contributions increased, as expected, close to the general and primary election,
there is evidence that interest groups, in some cases, were also directly targeting
contributions to influence legislation being considered by the state legislature. The
consideration of legislation exerted a positive influence on the number of contributions in
eight out of the twenty-five bills examined, thus providing support for hypothesis two.
Additionally, the eight significant pieces of legislation were in four different states. In three
of these cases, the state had no limits on contributions given during a legislation session. In
South Carolina, limits exist on contributions given during a session, but those limits only
pertain to lobbyist thus accounting for the finding in South Carolina. This study also
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provides some evidence that, when faced with legal restrictions, interest groups employ
alternative strategies that allow them to influence legislation even when faced with legal
restrictions.
The findings reveal that in 32% of the cases contributions increase prior to a major
legislative vote. While on the surface this may not appear to be very impressive, further
analysis provides strong evidence of the efforts of interest groups to influence policy
outcomes. The findings revealed in this dissertation likely underestimate the true number of
particularistic contributors for several reasons. First, the measurement created in this study
defines particularistic contributors as interest groups giving a contribution immediately
before and after the consideration of a piece of legislation. The measurement does not
account for particularistic contributors giving prior to the election, thereby underestimating
the true number of particularistic contributors. Second, contributors face different legal
restrictions on when they can give contributions. When we account for the legal restrictions
faced by contributors, the number of particularistic contributors becomes even more
impressive.

2.1. States without Session Limits on Campaign Contributions
Four states in the study place no restrictions on campaign contributions during a
legislative session. This study includes twelve bills in the four states without session limits.
Seven out of these twelve bills exerted a significant increase on the number of contributions
given to members of the legislature (see Table 6.1), thus providing additional support for
hypothesis two. Furthermore, at least one bill was significant in
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explaining contributions in each of the four states without limitations on contributions
during legislative sessions.
TABLE 6.1. ABOUT HERE
In addition to the increases in campaign contributions surrounding specific bills,
campaign contributions in general increased during the legislative session in California and
New York. On average, a 116% increase in contributions occurred in California and a 208%
increase occurred in New York while the legislature was in session with respect to the
baseline period. The increase in contributions during the legislative session provides
additional evidence that political action committees were attempting to influence the
outcome of legislation by providing contributions during the session. Kentucky and Illinois
saw a decrease in contributions during the legislative session (see Table 6.1.). The difference
in interest group activity may be the product of the fact that California, and New York are
highly professional states that meet in long sessions, thus providing contributors with fewer
opportunities to give contributions when the legislature is not in session. Furthermore,
Illinois has the least number of restrictions on contributors thus freeing contributors to give
contributions at any time and without restriction.
California Senate Bill 604, which created a Health and Wellness Promotion
Advisory Board, stimulated interest group activity in the California Senate (see table 6.2).
Insurance companies were greatly opposed to the legislation, which required insurers to
provide coverage for certain tests and to limit deductibles and copays. The legislation
enjoyed the greatest level of support in the Senate, which eventually passed the bill,
therefore insurance companies and other related business interest groups focused a great
deal of effort in attempting to influence the legislation in the Senate. While they were not
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successful in defeating the legislation in the Senate, the House failed to pass the legislation,
thus protecting the interest of the insurance companies. The minimum wage legislation in
California also exerted a positive significant increase in contributions, therefore, in two out
of the three cases in California contributors attempted to influence the outcome of legislation
in the California Senate, thus providing support for the second hypothesis.
TABLE 6.2. ABOUT HERE
The medical leave bill in Illinois also stimulated activity among contributors
resulting in a 117% increase in contributions when the legislation was under consideration.
The remaining two bills in Illinois resulted in a positive, but non-significant increase in PAC
activity. The findings in Illinois provide additional support for the second hypothesis that
PACs are attempting to influence the outcome of legislative votes.
TABLE 6.3. ABOUT HERE
The fourth bill found to exert a positive significant influence in states without session
limits is the worker’s compensation bill in Kentucky (see table 6.4.). A 260% increase in
contributions occurred surrounding the consideration of the legislation indicating that
political action committees were active in trying to influence the outcome of the black lung
legislation. However, Kentucky saw a decrease in contributions during the legislative
session. Still, contributors interested in the black lung legislation were active in trying to
influence the outcome of the bill.
TABLE 6.4. ABOUT HERE
The fifth bill found to be significant is the New York Senate women’s health care
bill (see table 6.5.). The legislation promoted interest group activity, with a 126% increase in
contributions occurring surrounding the time the legislation was under consideration. The
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same bill was also significant in the state house, resulting in a 164% increase in
contributions in the lower chamber. The final bill found significant in the New York
Assembly was the New York unemployment benefits legislation. The legislation resulted in
a 218% increase in contributions. Despite opposition by business groups, the legislation was
still able to pass the Democratic House before failing in the Republican Senate. New York
provides additional support for hypothesis two. The findings for the four states with no
session limits reveal direct evidence of PACs attempting to influence legislative outcomes in
58% of the cases thus bolstering support of the second hypothesis.
TABLE 6.5. ABOUT HERE
2.2. States with prohibitions on campaign contributions during legislative sessions
Three states in the sample prohibit all contributions during a legislative session,
therefore, PACs are unable to provide legal contributions during the legislative session.
Interest group activity was examined surrounding nine bills in three states with session
limits on contributions. The legislative session was found to result in a significant decrease
in contributions in eight out of the nine cases, thus indicating that session limits were
successful in limiting contributions close to a legislative vote (see Tables 6.6-6.8). In order
to give a contribution during the legislative session a contributor would be breaking the law
and is not willing to go that far to contribute. These findings, however, do not indicate that
session limits are successful in removing the undue influence of money from the legislative
process. The inability of contributors to give during the legislative session results in
particularistic contributors having to employ alternative strategies in order to influence
policy outcomes.
TABLES 6.6. TO 6.8. ABOUT HERE
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The employee protection act (HB 62) in New Mexico results in a 15% decrease in
contributions when the legislature was in session. Additionally, the New Mexico minimum
wage bill (HJR 8) saw a 13% decrease in contributions (see Table 6.6). Contributions by
contributors concerned with the Utah health insurance decrease by 36% during the session,
while the minimum wage bill results in a 34% decrease in contributions, and the health
insurance bills results in a 9% decrease in contributions by interested contributors during the
legislative session (see Table 6.7). These findings are consistent with what we expected to
find given the prohibition of contributions during the legislative session.
Additionally, as expected in the states with prohibitions on campaign contributions,
legislative activity was found to be negatively related with contributions in eight out of the
nine cases, with no significant relationship found in the remaining case (see Table 6.9). It is
obvious from the results that session limits on campaign contributions clearly limits the
activity of interest groups during the session. The limitation of contributions during the
legislative session removes one aspect of the appearance of PACs being able to garner
undue influence by giving a contribution during the legislative session.

3. The Impact of Session Limits on Contributions Patterns
The contribution patterns differed in states placing session limits on campaign
contributions. A greater increase in contributions occurred surrounding both the primary and
general election in states limiting all campaign contributions during legislative sessions, thus
providing support for the third hypothesis. There was a 348% increase in campaign
contributions during the two months leading up to the general election in the four states
without limits on contributions during legislative sessions, compared to a 953% increase
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prior to the election in states with limits on contributions during legislative sessions (see
table 6.10). Furthermore, there was an average increase of 263% in campaign contributions
prior to the primary in states without session limits compared to an increase of 351% in
states with session limits.
TABLE 6.10. ABOUT HERE
The difference in election contributions between states allowing session
contributions and those not allowing session contributions provides some evidence that
interest groups may shift their strategies when faced with session limits. Interest groups
faced with legal restrictions when attempting to influence legislative outcomes employ
alternative strategies to advance their agenda, such as influencing the outcome of the
election. Additionally, some interest groups may be giving election contributions as a
reward for past legislative support and in the effort to influence legislation in the next
legislative session.

4. Legislative Sessions and Contribution Patterns
The results indicate interest groups are engaging in influencing behavior prior to the
beginning of the legislative session in four of the nine states including Georgia and Utah that
prohibit contributions during the legislative session, thus providing support for hypothesis
four. Additionally, there is evidence that contributors are engaging in rewarding behavior at
the completion of the legislative session, in the highly professional states of California,
Illinois, and New York that allow contributions during the legislative session. However,
there is no evidence that contributors are rewarding legislators in states that prohibit
contributions during the legislative session. Additionally, there is evidence that interest
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groups are engaging in influencing behavior in states with and without limits on
contributions during the legislative session. However, the increase in contributions prior to
the beginning of the session appears to be greater in states with session limits. These
findings provide evidence that interest groups are not just providing contributions to
legislators supportive of their agenda, but are attempting to influence legislative vote
outcomes. If interest groups only provide contributions to legislators who are predisposed to
support their position, then the motivation to provide contributions prior to the beginning of
the legislative session is much less, and the interest group may have an incentive to not
provide a contribution that looks like it is attempting to influencing the outcome of a
legislative vote. An examination of the pattern of campaign contributions, while not
providing evidence of the success of contributions in changing legislative votes, does
provide some evidence that contributors believe contributions are successful in affecting
vote outcomes.

4.1. Contribution patterns in states with session limits on contributions
Despite the hurdles interest groups face in a state with session limits, it is highly
unlikely interest groups simply pack their bags, go home, and stop attempting to influence
legislative outcomes. Therefore, in these states contributors have to implement new
strategies of influencing election outcomes. One potential strategy is to shift contributions
to immediately before the legislative session begins.
In Utah, we see a spike in the number of contributions given just prior to the
beginning of the legislative session in 2001 in the health care sector, thus providing support
for hypothesis four (see Figures 6.0 and 6.1). Two weeks prior to the beginning of the
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section there are 79 contributions given to legislators. In the week prior to the general
election 96 contributions are given. This is the only other week in the two years examined
in which there are more contributions given than the 79 given two weeks prior to the
beginning of the legislative session. Furthermore, 105 contributions occur in the two weeks
prior to the beginning of the legislative session in 2001, which indicates PACs are likely
employing an influencing strategy in which they are trying to shape legislation under
consideration in the upcoming legislative session.
FIGURES 6.0. and 6.1. ABOUT HERE
Contributions do not increase as greatly prior to the beginning of the 2002 Utah
legislative session. Twenty-five contributions are during the month prior to the beginning of
the legislative session. While this is not a high number of contributions, the largest increase
in the number of contributions since prior to the beginning of the 2001 session occurs during
the month prior to the 2002 session.
Additionally, we find an average increase of 579% in the two weeks prior to the
beginning of the legislative session in Utah, thus providing support for the fourth hypothesis.
Only four contributions occur in the month following the legislative session resulting in on
average a 28% decrease in contributions during the two weeks following the end of the
session, therefore providing no support for a reward strategy and hypothesis five.
Contribution patterns found in the business sector were similar to what was found in
the health and insurance sectors (see Figure 6.2). During the two weeks prior to the
beginning of the 2001 legislative session, 63 contributions were given to legislators.
Additionally, during the month prior to the beginning of the 2002 legislative session there
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were 23 contributions. The largest number of contributions given in any one week during
2001 and 2002 was 75, given two months prior to the election.
FIGURE 6.2. ABOUT HERE
An examination of contribution patterns in the New Mexico House reveals little
evidence of influencing or rewarding behavior in the business and labor sectors (see Figures
6.3-6.5). However, there is slightly more evidence that influencing behavior is occurring in
the health care sector and insurance sectors in the Senate, however, the increase did not
attain statistical significance. The largest number of contributions given in one week across
the two years is 26 which are given one month prior to the beginning of the legislative
session. Additionally, there is no evidence that contributors in any sector in New Mexico are
engaging in rewarding behavior. Furthermore, there is 42% decrease in contributions in the
two weeks following the legislative session.
FIGURES 6.3. to 6.5. ABOUT HERE
Campaign contributions in Georgia were very similar to Utah. There is evidence that
contributors are engaging in influencing behavior across, the, insurance, health care sector as
well as the business and labor sectors. In the week prior to the beginning of the legislative
session in 2001, contributors with interest in the insurance sector gave 45 contributions to
legislators (see Figure 6.6). In 2002, when the Georgia insurance bill was considered,
contributors gave 108 contributions in the week prior to the beginning of the legislative
session and 320 contributions in the month prior to the beginning of the legislative session.
In the month following the conclusion of the 2001 legislative session, contributors gave 29
contributions while 57 contributions occurred in the month following the 2002 session.
Furthermore, an analysis of HB 1492 reveals an 18% increase in contributions prior to the
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beginning of the legislative session thus providing evidence to support hypothesis four. It
appears that contributors in the insurance sector are providing contributions prior to the
beginning of the legislative session in the hope of influencing policy outcomes during the
legislative session. This finding also provides evidence that interest groups reformulate their
strategies when facing a prohibition on contributions during the legislative session.
FIGURE 6.6. ABOUT HERE
Influencing behavior occurred in the business sector as well (see Figure 6.7). PACs
gave 19 contributions during the week prior to the beginning of the 2001 legislative session.
Additionally, PACs provided 63 contributions in the week prior to the beginning of the 2002
legislative session. In the month following the 2001 legislative session only 22 contributions
occurred with 17 contributions given in the month following the 2002 session. Furthermore,
there was a 167% increase in contributions in the two weeks prior to the legislative session,
thus providing additional support for hypothesis four while a 54% decrease in contributions
occurred after the session was complete providing evidence that contributors were not
engaging in reward behavior.
FIGURE 6.7. ABOUT HERE
Similar patterns occurred in the energy sector in Georgia. More groups appear to be
providing contributions prior to the beginning of the session than at the conclusion of the
legislative session (see Figure 6.8). Contributors gave 24 contributions in the week prior to
the beginning of the 2001 legislative session with 82 contributions given in the week prior to
the beginning of the 2002 legislative session. As in the previous cases, fewer contributions
followed the legislative session. Only 24 contributions occurred in the month following the
2001 session and only 24 contributions in the month following the 2002 legislative session.
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Furthermore, a 217% increase in contributions occurred prior to the beginning of the
legislative session while a 43% decreased occurred at the end of the legislative session.
FIGURE 6.8. ABOUT HERE
4.2. Contribution patterns in states without session limits on contributions
There is some evidence that contributors are rewarding legislators for what they did
during the course of the legislative session even though they are able to provide
contributions throughout the legislative session in California, Illinois and New York. There
is also evidence that contributors are attempting to influence legislators prior to the
beginning of the legislative session in California and Kentucky. In California, there was a
significant increase in contribution activity during the legislative session (see table 6.2).
Additionally, there is on average a 154% increase in contributions in the two weeks
following the end of the legislative session. This finding provides evidence that
contributions increased at the end of the legislative session as a reward for support during
the legislative session and in particular what occurred at the end of the legislative session
when the majority of legislation tends to be passed.
In the health care and insurance sectors the week immediately following the
legislative session was found to be significant in explaining contributions. In fact, each of
the two weeks following the end of the legislative session was significant in explaining
campaign contributions (see Figures 6.9 and 6.10). In the case of the California, minimum
wage bill 148 contributions were given in the two weeks following the end of the legislative
session in 2001, and 84 contributions were given in the two weeks following the 2002
legislative session (see Figure 6.11).
FIGURES 6.9 TO 6.11. ABOUT HERE
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The California minimum wage bill saw 95 contributions given during the week prior
to the beginning of the legislative session. Additionally, a 260% increase in contributions
occurred prior to the beginning of the legislative session. The California worker’s
compensation bill saw 131 contributions given in the week prior to the beginning of the
2002 legislative session, and a 233% increase in contributions in the two weeks prior to the
beginning of the legislative session. The California health care bill saw 85 contributions
given in the week prior to the beginning of the legislative session, and a 201% increase in
contributions.
There is also some evidence in Illinois that PACs are giving contributions following
the legislative session as a reward for legislative vote outcomes. There was a significant
increase in contributions during the two weeks following the legislative session in two out of
the three cases in Illinois (see Figures 6.12-6.14). The medical leave and minimum wage
legislative saw a 143% increase in contributions at the end of the legislative session. On the
other hand, a decrease in contributions occurred prior to the beginning of the legislative
session in all three cases.
FIGURES 6.12. TO 6.14. ABOUT HERE
In New York there is no evidence that contributors are attempting to influencing
legislation prior to the beginning of the session, however, there is evidence that PACs are
rewarding legislators upon completion of the session. A 153% percent increase in
contribution occurred among contributors concerned with the legislation on unemployment
benefits, and a 238% increase occurred in the two weeks after the end of the session among
contributors interested in the minimum wage legislation.
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Reward behavior occurred in California, Illinois, and New York, which are the three
most professional states in the sample, and three of the four states that allow contributions
during the legislative session. Legislators in highly professional states may likely serve in
the legislature longer than members in amateur legislatures, therefore, PACs have to develop
long-term strategies that reward supporters of their position. It does not make sense to give a
contribution following a legislative vote if the member will not be around in the future when
additional legislation is considered. However, it is important to reward those legislators that
have the potential to influence legislative outcomes in the future.
FIGURES 6.15. TO 6.18. ABOUT HERE

5. States which Place Limits on Campaign Contributions during Sessions
South Carolina and Wisconsin do not prohibit all contributions during the legislative
session, however, they do prohibit contributions by lobbyist during legislative sessions. Of
the four bills examined in the two states, three were found not significant in explaining
contribution patterns (see Tables 6.11 and 6.12). The health insurance task force bill in
South Carolina was the only bill found to exert a significant and positive influence on the
number of contributions (see Table 6.11), thus providing support for hypothesis two. An
increase of 342% in contributions occurred during the vote event period surrounding the
consideration of the legislation that established a task force to conduct a comprehensive
review of health insurance mandates. Conversely, there is no indication that contributors in
South Carolina are increasing contributions just prior to the beginning of the legislative
session or immediately following the conclusion of the legislative session as the beginning
and end of session variables are insignificant in all cases (see Figures 6.19-6.21).
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Contributors are giving contributions throughout the legislative session with the session
resulting in a positive increase on contributions in all three cases and a significant increase
on the minimum wage and right to work legislation. On average, there was a 168% increase
in contributions during the legislative session across the two significant pieces of legislation.
These findings indicate that contributors increase their activity during the legislative session,
thus providing support for hypothesis two that interest groups are attempting to influence the
outcome of legislative votes.
TABLES 6.11. AND 6.12. ABOUT HERE
FIGURES 6.19 TO 6.21. ABOUT HERE

6. Legislative Professionalism and Campaign Contributions
An additional examination of the findings appears to indicate a relationship between
legislative professionalism and campaign contributions. Four of the nine states in the sample
are in the top quarter of states on Squire’s (1992) measure of legislative professionalism.14
In those four states there was on average a 209% increase in campaign contributions prior to
the general election. In contrast, four of the states are in the bottom quarter of Squire’s
ranking,15 and in those states there was on average a 906% increase in contributions prior to
the general election (see Table 6.13). Furthermore, an examination of the primaries reveal
similar results with a 191% increase in contributions in those states considered the most
professional, and a 376% increase in contributions in those states at the low end of the
professionalism ranking,

14

Squire (1992) ranks New York 1st, California 3rd, Illinois 8th, and Wisconsin 12th on his index of
professionalism.
15
Squire (1992) ranks Georgia 39th, Kentucky 44th, New Mexico 45th, and Utah 47th on his index of
professionalism.
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TABLE 6.13. ABOUT HERE
From these findings it appears that PACs are targeting the elections more in the
amateur legislatures than in more professional legislatures. This may be the product of the
fact that the legislatures in the more professional states have a more expansive agendas than
is the case in the amateur legislatures, and therefore they are more likely to target legislation
in the professional legislature.
Three out of the four states in the top quarter of legislative professionalism have no
limits on contributions given during legislative sessions, and Wisconsin only bans
contributions from lobbyists (see Table 6.14). In states that allow any contributions during
the legislative session, we see on average an increase of 348% in the number of
contributions given. However in those states that fully ban contributions during a legislative
session, we see on average a 953% increase in the number of contributions given prior to the
general elections. This indicates the possibility that interest groups shift their contributions
to the election when faced with session limits. Additionally, in those states which allow
contributions during the legislative session, PACs can target the legislation directly instead
of shifting contributions to just prior to the beginning or end of the session or to the election.
TABLE 6.14. ABOUT HERE
Three out of four of the states, at the bottom quarter of the professionalism scale, ban
contributions during the legislative session. Only Kentucky allows contributions during the
legislative session, therefore given the legal restraints faced by PACs in these states, it is
likely they will shift their contribution patterns, with more contributions given during the
course of the elections and supporting hypothesis three.
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7. Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter reveal that contributions consistently increase
close to the general and primary election across all states in the sample. Additionally, in six
out of nine states the general election is the most important factor in explaining campaign
contributions, with the primary being the most important factor in Illinois and South
Carolina and the beginning of the legislative session being the most important in California.
This provides support for hypothesis one that the election will be the most important factor
in explaining contributions. These findings are consistent with expectations since it is
impossible to determine if contributions given prior to the election are given particularistic
or universalistic.
The findings presented in this chapter also provide evidence that contributors attempt
to influence legislative outcomes, and this supports hypothesis two. Significant increases in
contributions occur close to legislative votes in states where contributors are not prohibited
from giving by law. Additionally, increases in legislative activity are significant in
explaining contributions when session limits are not in place, thus providing additional
support for hypothesis two. Third, contributions increase by 348% close to the general
election in states that do not prohibit contributions during the legislative session in
comparison to a 953% increase in states that prohibit contributions during the session. These
findings provide support for hypothesis three thus indicating that interest group activity
close to the general election is greater in states that prohibit contributions during the
legislative session. Furthermore, these findings provide additional evidence that session
limits do not limit money going to legislators, but merely shift when it is being given.
Fourth, the results for Utah and Georgia provide evidence that interest groups attempt to
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influence policy outcomes even when faced with session limits by shifting their
contributions to just prior to the beginning of the legislative session thus supporting
hypothesis four. Finally, there is no evidence to support hypothesis five. Reward behavior at
the end of the session was not found in the states with session limits. Additionally, reward
behavior was only found in the highly professional states of California, Illinois and New
York. This finding may indicate that interest groups are more likely to reward members in
professional legislature were members are more likely to serve for more years thus making it
important to establish long term relationships with legislators.
The findings in this chapter clearly reveal that interest groups in state legislatures are
attempting to influence policy outcomes. The evidence overwhelmingly supports hypothesis
two, that interest groups are attempting to influencing policy outcomes, despite the fact that
the measurement employed in this study clearly underestimates the number of particularistic
contributors. The results presented in this chapter provide insight into how to write more
effective campaign finance laws to remove the undue influence of money from politics. In
the next chapter I discuss the implications of the findings for the understanding of the
behavior of interest groups and how that understanding affects future reform efforts.
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Table 6.0. General and Primary Election Contribution Increases
State
Bill
Subject
General
Election
Increase In
Contributions
California S.B. 604
Health Care
155%
California A.B. 2242
Minimum Wage
161%
California S.B. 71
Worker’s Compensation
158%
Georgia
H.B. 1568
Natural Gas
397%
Georgia
H.B. 1492
Insurance Bill
279%
Georgia
S.B. 14
Minimum Wage
464%
Illinois
H.B. 2487
Medical Leave
193%
Illinois
H.B. 4540
Minimum Wage
193%
Illinois
S.B. 1341
Insurance
203%
Kentucky H.B. 132
Black Lung
760%
Kentucky H.B.348
Worker’s Compensation
773%
New
H.B. 62
Employee Protection
1538%
Mexico
New
S.B. 439
Health Care
Not
Mexico
Significant
New
H.J.R 8
Minimum Wage
1570%
Mexico
New York A.B. 11723 Senate Women’s health care 204%
New York A.B. 11723 House Women’s health care 199%
(House)
New York A.B. 11624 Unemployment benefits
337%
New York A.B. 5132
Minimum Wage
337%
South
H.B. 4583
Health insurance task force
461%
Carolina
South
H.B. 3289
Minimum wage
479%
Carolina
South
H.B. 3142
Right to work
479%
Carolina
Utah
H.B. 105
Health insurance
845%
Utah
S.B. 138
Minimum wage
1121%
Utah
H.B. 238
Tobacco tax
806%
Wisconsin S.B. 251
Worker’s compensation
212%
Averages
514%
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Primary
Election
Increase in
Contributions
195%
148%
153%
325%
326%
381%
224%
213%
241%
434%
464%
647%
299%
662%
125%
173%
276%
276%
639%
405%
412%
187%
154%
179%
160%
308%

Table 6.1. Contributions Patterns in States without Limits on Session Contributions
State
Bill
Reference in
Legislative
Contributions
Paper
Event
During the
Legislative
Session
California
S.B. 604
Health Care
154% Increase
Not
Significant
California
A.B. 2242
Minimum Wage
117% Increase
115%
Increase
California
S.B. 71
Worker’s
Not Significant 117%
Compensation
Increase
Illinois
H.B. 2487
Medical Leave
117% Increase
80%
Decrease
Illinois
H.B. 4540
Minimum Wage
Not Significant 84%
Decrease
Illinois
S.B. 1341
Insurance
Not Significant 68%
Decrease
Kentucky
H.B. 132
Black Lung
11% Decrease
287%
Decrease
Kentucky
H.B.348
Worker’s
260% Increase
29%
Compensation
Decrease
New York
A.B. 11723
Senate women’s
126% Increase
172%
(Senate)
health care
Increase
New York
A.B. 11723
House women’s
164% Increase
132%
(House)
health care
Increase
New York
A.B. 11624
Unemployment
218% Increase
253%
benefits
Increase
New York
A.B. 5132
Minimum Wage
Not Significant 275%
Increase
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Table 6.2. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the California
Senate: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
SB604 (Health
SB71 (Worker’s
AB2242 (Minimum
Care)
Compensation)
Wage)
Vote Event
.430*
.081
.158*
(.055)
(.057)
(.057)
General
.436*
.454*
.474*
Election
(.071)
(.061)
(.079)
Primary
.670*
.425*
.390*
Election
(.062)
(.054)
(.071)
Session
.046
.158*
.140*
(.057)
(.048)
(.062)
Beginning of .698*
.848*
.955*
Session
(.119)
(.098)
(.121)
End of
.728*
.651*
.531*
Session
(.082)
(.072)
(.098)
N
80075
98037
56997
Number of
770
943
549
PACs
Log-11056
-14636
-8840
likelihood
Notes:
Statistical
significance
at the .05
level
indicated
by*
Standard
errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.3. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Illinois
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
HB 2487 (Medical
SB 1341
HB 4540
Leave)
(Insurance)
(Minimum
Wage)
Vote Event
.158*
.110
.015
(.066)
(.089)
(.060)
General Election
.659*
.707*
.659*
(.049)
(.056)
(.049)
Primary Election
.804*
.878*
.757*
(.055)
(.069)
(.054)
Session
-.219*
-.390*
-.177*
(.043)
(.053)
(.040)
Beginning of Session
-.785*
-767*
-.785*
(.139)
(.160)
(.139)
End of Session
.356*
.105
.356*
(.073)
(.097)
(.073)
N
61305
66510
61305
Number of PACs
594
642
594
Log-likelihood
-13809
-10197
-13812
Notes: Statistical
significance at the .05
level indicated by*
Standard errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.4. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Kentucky
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
HB 132 (Black Lung)
HB 348 (Worker’s
Compensation)
Vote Event
-2.21*
.955*
(1.02)
(.303)
General Election
2.03*
2.05*
(.100)
(.100)
Primary Election
1.47*
1.53*
(.133)
(.133)
Session
-1.25*
-1.78*
(.214)
(.236)
Beginning of Session
1.44*
.871*
(.209)
(.300)
End of Session
-.993*
-1.03*
(.293)
(.292)
N
10714
10714
Number of PACs
103
103
Log-likelihood
-1937
-1937
Notes: Statistical significance
at the .05 level indicated by*
Standard errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.5. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the New York:
Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
AB 11723
AB 11723
AB 11624
AB 5132
(Senate –
(House –
(House –
(House _
Women’s
Women’s
Unemployment
Minimum
Health Care)
Health Care)
Benefits)
Wage)
Vote Event
.234**
.496**
.779**
-.072
(.077)
(.099)
(.100)
(.108)
General
.711**
.690**
1.22**
1.22**
Election
(.094)
(.116)
(.140)
(.140)
Primary
.219**
.546**
1.02**
1.02**
Election
(.099)
(.116)
(.139)
(.139)
Session
.543**
.275**
.928**
1.01**
(.085)
(.108)
(.142)
(.142)
Beginning of -.115
.256
-.509
-.505
Session
(.208)
(.233)
(.468)
(.468)
End of
.101
.123
.423*
.867**
Session
(.148)
(.181)
(.224)
(.215)
N
84056
41887
35254
35254
Number of
812
403
339
339
PACs
Log-9927
-4753
-3761
-3786
likelihood
Notes:
Statistical
significance
at the .05
level
indicated
by**
Statistical
significance
at the .1
level
indicated by
*
Standard
errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.6. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the New
Mexico Senate: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
SB 439 (Health Care)
HB 62
HJR 8
(Employee
(Minimum
Protection)
Wage)
General Election
-.280
2.73**
2.75**
(.351)
(.115)
(.122)
Primary Election
1.09**
1.87**
1.89**
(.201)
(.136)
(.143)
Session
-14.28
-1.88**
-2.06**
(292.51)
(.508)
(.585)
Beginning of Session
.275
-1.72*
-1.20*
(.393)
(1.00)
(.714)
End of Session
-.572
-.926**
-1.22**
(.588)
(.585)
(.714)
N
7696
11327
9663
Number of PACs
74
110
94
Log-likelihood
-595
-1595
-1447
Notes: Statistical
significance at the .05
level indicated by**
Statistical significance
at the .1 level indicated
by *
Standard errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.7. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Utah House:
Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
HB 105 (Health
HB 238
SB 138
Insurance)
(Tobacco Tax)
(Minimum
Wage)
General Election
2.13**
2.09**
2.42**
(.105)
(.104)
(.141)
Primary Election
.628**
.580**
.433*
(.162)
(.161)
(.253)
Session
-1.02**
-2.39**
-1.08**
(.261)
(.505)
(.393)
Beginning of Session
1.65**
1.60**
1.98**
(.154)
(.152)
(.196)
End of Session
-1.08**
-1.13**
-1.71*
(.505)
(.505)
(1.01)
N
10406
10405
8836
Number of PACs
101
101
85
Log-likelihood
-1896
-1880
-1085
Notes: Statistical
significance at the .05
level indicated by**
Statistical significance
at the .1 level indicated
by *
Standard errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.8. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Georgia
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
HB 1568 (Natural Gas) HB 1492
SB 14
(Insurance Bill) (Minimum
Wage)
General Election
1.38**
1.03**
1.53**
(.076)
(.057)
(.081)
Primary Election
1.18**
1.18**
1.34**
(.081)
(.055)
(.086)
Session
-1.45**
-1.73**
-1.32**
(.145)
(.110)
(.153)
Beginning of Session
.773**
.499**
.513**
(.146)
(.109)
(.177)
End of Session
-.843**
-1.30**
-.616**
(.254)
(.215)
(.256)
N
30261
63023
28715
Number of PACs
294
607
280
Log-likelihood
-3926
-7683
-3502
Notes: Statistical
significance at the .05
level indicated by**
Statistical significance
at the .1 level indicated
by *
Standard errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.9. Impact of Legislative Session in States with Contribution Restrictions during
Legislative Sessions
State
Bill
Subject
Legislative Session
Georgia
H.B. 1568
Natural Gas
23% Decrease
Georgia
H.B. 1492
Insurance
18% Decrease
Georgia
S.B. 14
Minimum Wage
27% Decrease
New Mexico
H.B. 62
Employee
15% Decrease
Protection
New Mexico
S.B. 439
Health Care
Not Significant
New Mexico
H.J.R. 8
Minimum Wage
13% Decrease
Utah
H.B. 105
Health Insurance
36% Decrease
Utah
S.B. 138
Minimum Wage
34% Decrease
Utah
H.B. 238
Tobacco Tax
9% Decrease
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Table 6.10. Average Increase in Campaign Contributions
States
General
Primary
States With
Without
Election
Election
Session
Session
Average
Average
Limits
Limits
Increase
Increase
California
158%
165%
Georgia
Kentucky
767%
449%
New Mexico
Illinois
196%
226%
Utah
New York
269%
213%
Average
348%
263%
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General
Election
Average
Increase
380%
1554%
924%

Primary
Election
Average
Increase
344%
536%
173%

953%

351%

Table 6.11. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the South
Carolina House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
HB 4583 (Health
HB 3289
HB 3142 (Right
Insurance Task Force) (Minimum
to Work)
Wage)
Vote Event
1.13*
-.679*
-.657*
(.168)
(.237)
(.247)
General Election
1.53*
1.57*
1.57*
(.145)
(.140)
(.140)
Primary Election
1.85*
1.40*
1.42*
(.143)
(.126)
(.126)
Session
.064
.526*
.509*
(.152)
(.134)
(.133)
Beginning of Session
-.006
.086
.086
(.391)
(.366)
(.366)
End of Session
.091
.221
.209
(.249)
(.267)
(.267)
N
18720
21944
21944
Number of PACs
180
211
211
Log-likelihood
-1837
-1941
-1942
Notes: Statistical
significance at the .05
level indicated by*
Standard errors are in
parentheses
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Table 6.12. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Wisconsin
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model
SB 251 (Worker’s Compensation)
Vote Event
-14.47
(419.17)
General Election
.752*
(.139)
Primary Election
.470*
(.145)
Session
-1.29*
(.151)
Beginning of Session
-15.75
(784.21)
End of Session
.122
(.308)
N
6761
Number of PACs
65
Log-likelihood
-1233
Notes: Statistical significance at the .05
level indicated by*
Standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 6.13. Contribution Increases by Rank of Professionalism
Squire’s Rank of
State
General Election
Professionalism
1
New York
269%
3
California
158%
8
Illinois
196%
12
Wisconsin
212%
28
South Carolina
473%
39
Georgia
380%
44
Kentucky
767%
45
New Mexico
1554%
47
Utah
924%
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Primary
213%
165%
226%
160%
485%
344%
449%
536%
173%

Table 6.14. Contribution Increases by Rank of Professionalism
Squire’s Rank of
State
Session
General
Professionalism
Limits
Election
1
New York
No
269%
3
California
No
158%
8
Illinois
No
196%
12
Wisconsin
Lobbyist
212%
Only
28
South Carolina
Lobbyist
473%
Only
39
Georgia
Yes
380%
44
Kentucky
No
767%
45
New Mexico
Yes
1554%
47
Utah
Yes
924%
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Primary
213%
165%
226%
160%
485%
344%
449%
536%
173%

Figure 6.0. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 105 – Health Insurance)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 78
HB 105 Achieved Final Passage in Week 57
2001 Session Begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 9
2002 Session Begin in Week 55 and Ends Week 62
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Figure 6.1. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 238 – Tobacco Tax)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 78
HB 238 Achieved Final Passage in Week 61
2001 Session Begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 9
2002 Session Begin in Week 55 and Ends Week 62
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Figure 6.2. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 138 – Minimum Wage)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 78
SB 138 Achieved Final Passage in Week 9
2001 Session Begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 9
2002 Session Begin in Week 55 and Ends Week 62
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Figure 6.3. New Mexico Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (SB439 – Health Care)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001
Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 75
SB 439 Achieved Final Passage in Week 10
2001 Session begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 11
2002 Session begin in Week 55 and ended in Week 59
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Figure 6.4. New Mexico House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 62 – Employee
Protection)
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HB 16 Final Passage Vote in Week 7
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Figure 6.5. New Mexico House Campaign Contributions by Week (HJR 8 – Minimum
Wage)
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2002 Session begin in Week 55 and ended in Week 59
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Figure 6.6. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 1492 - Insurance)

0

20

40
60
W eeks 2001-2002

Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001
Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 86
HB 1492 Achieved Final Passage in Week 65
2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 12
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 67

147

80

100

0

Number of Contributions Per Week
50
100

150

Figure 6.7. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 14 – Minimum Wage)
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Figure 6.8. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 1568 – Natural Gas)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001
Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 86
HB 1568 Achieved Final Passage in Week 64
2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 12
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 67
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Figure 6.9. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 71 – Worker’s
Compensation)
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Figure 6.10. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 604 – Health Care)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 62
SB 604 Achieved Final Passage in Week 23
2001 Session Begin in Week 1 and ended in week 37
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 87
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Figure 6.11. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 2242 – Minimum
Wage)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 62
AB 2242 Failed to Pass Senate and Went to the Inactive File in Week 87
2001 Session Begin in Week 1 and Ended in Week 37
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and Ended in Week 87
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Figure 6.12. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 4540 – Minimum Wage)

Number of Contributions Per Week

300

200

100

0
0

20

40

60

Weeks 2001-2002

Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 64
HB 4540 Achieved Final Passage in Week 66
2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 22
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 74
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Figure 6.13. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 1341 - Insurance)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 64
SB 1341 Achieved Final Passage in Week 18
2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 22
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 74
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Figure 6.14. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 2487 – Medical Leave)
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2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 22
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Figure 6.15. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 5132 – Minimum
Wage)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 89
AB 5132 Achieved Final Passage in Week 12
2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77

156

80

100

Figure 6.16. New York Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 11723 – Women’s
Health Care)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 89
AB 11723 Achieved Final Passage in Week 76
2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77
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Figure 6.17. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 11624 –
Unemployment Benefits)
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002
General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 89
AB 11624 Achieved Final Passage in Week 76
2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77
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Figure 6.18. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 11723 – Women’s
Health Care)
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General Election Occurred in Week 97
Primary Occurred in Week 89
AB 11723 Achieved Final Passage in Week 76
2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49
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Figure 6.19. South Carolina House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 3142 – Right to
Work)
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Primary Occurred in Week 76
HB 3142 Achieved Final Passage in Week 7
2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended week 23
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended week 75
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Figure 6.20. South Carolina House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 3289 – Minimum
Wage)
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Primary Occurred in Week 76
HB 3289 Achieved Final Passage in Week 8
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Figure 6.21. South Carolina House Contributions by Week (HB 4583 – Health Insurance
Task Force)
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Discussion

The findings presented in this dissertation have provided an increased understanding
of the motivation of PACs providing campaign contributions to legislators. It is apparent
from the findings that interest groups are behaving in a manner that leads to the conclusion
that they believe money is useful in securing a desired legislative outcome. While the results
presented here indicate that proximity to the general election and the primary are
consistently the most important factors in explaining patterns of campaign contributions, it
remains uncertain as to the portion of the increase in contributions prior to the election that
can be contributed to universalistic contributors, and the portion that are contributed to
particularistic contributors. See tables 7.0 and 7.1 for a summary of the results presented in
chapter six.
TABLES 7.0. and 7.1. ABOUT HERE
The research presented in this dissertation does not prove that contributors are
gaining influence through providing contributions. However, the findings offer significant
insight into the actions of contributors. It is clear from this dissertation that contributors are
attempting to influence the outcome of elections and legislative votes. This dissertation
provides empirical evidence of particularistic behavior of contributors in state legislatures.
Stratmann (1998) found an increase of contribution surrounding the general election,
primary election and important legislative events in Congress. Furthermore, he found that
the greatest increase in contributions occurred surrounding the general elections and he
concluded that PACs use contributions to prevent legislators from reneging on quid pro quo
agreements. The findings presented in this study expand the findings of Stratmann to the
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state level. Consistent with the findings of Stratmann (1998) the general election was
consistently the largest explanation of contributions in state legislators. Additionally, the
findings of this dissertation reveal that PACs are behaving at the state level in a manner
similar to the national level in that PACs at the state level are also using contributions to
prevent legislators from reneging of quid pro quo agreements.
In addition to confirming the findings of Stratmann (1998) at the national level, the
state level analysis deepens our understanding of PAC behavior. The state level analysis
presented in this dissertation upholds the findings of Stratmann (1998) even when faced with
session limits on contributions. PACs provide contributions prior to the beginning of the
legislative session in states with session limits to prevent legislators from reneging on quid
pro quo agreements. The findings presented in this research combined with the research at
the national level provides a fuller understanding of the actions of PACs that are attempting
to influence policy outcomes at all levels of government.
Given the incentives contributors have to hide the true intentions of donations, it is
even more remarkable that there is direct evidence of PACs attempting to influence the
legislative process. In 32% of all cases examined in this study, there was direct evidence of
PACs attempting to influence the outcome of a legislative vote. If we remove the states that
prohibit all contributions during a legislative session, the number jumps to 50%, therefore
there is direct evidence that in half the cases interest groups were attempting to influence the
outcome of legislative votes.
Interest groups attempt to influence legislative outcomes by providing a contribution
close to a legislative vote, or at the beginning of the legislative session with the later
strategy, likely employed in cases were it is not legally permissible to give close to the
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legislative vote. In 56% of the cases in this study contributors were engaged in influencing
behavior by providing a contribution close to a legislative vote or at the beginning of the
legislative session. Furthermore, there is evidence that contributors in states that limit
contributions during sessions have merely changed their strategy to account for this hurdle,
but are not removed from the political process as many reforms attempted.
The results reported strongly indicate that campaign contribution patterns are
strongly influence by the structure and laws of the system of which they are part. When
examining contributions patterns across legislation in different economic sectors within the
same state, there are very similar patterns of contributions. While in some states we see that
one piece of legislation is significant in explaining contribution patterns while another in the
same state is not significant, the general pattern of contributions across both sectors tend to
be similar.
The findings presented in this dissertation are at the heart of the debate of
representation in a democratic society. The basic principle of a democratic society is
majority rule, therefore, if policy outcomes are the will of the majority then understanding
interest group activity is not important as policy outcomes are what the majority desired.
However, understanding interest group activities is much more important when it results in
policy outcomes that are against the will of the majority. Campaign finance reforms are
often efforts to insure the will of the majority is not overrode by a minority with the ability
to bring about an anti-majority outcome through the giving of money and other favors to
political decision makers. On the other hand, a democratic society has a responsibility to
protect the rights of those in the minority, thus creating a major dilemma for democracy.
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Interest group activity that results in policy outcomes against the will of the majority may
not necessarily be bad for democracy, but may actually protect the rights of minority groups.
Freedom of speech and expression are also important components of a democratic
society. Citizens in a democracy should have the opportunity to have their beliefs heard,
however, the opportunity to have your beliefs heard differs across individuals of different
backgrounds. Given the inequality of access to the political system across citizens, campaign
finance has to balance the freedom of speech rights of groups with money with the rights of
those groups that may not enjoy the same access. Additionally, interest groups also give a
voice to the views of citizens that they would not otherwise have if they were trying to
influence government individually. Reformers, therefore, have to exercise caution that
efforts to remove the influence of interest groups from the political process may have the
unintended consequence of diminishing even further the average citizens influence on policy
outcomes and may shift the influence to wealthy individuals that have the power and
influence to affect policy outcomes independently of interest groups.
Legitimacy is another important component of a democratic society. The ability of
leaders to govern is centered on citizens recognizing their right to govern. Perceptions are
often as important as reality when it comes to the legitimacy of government. The appearance
of corruption is often as damaging to a government as actual corruption. Campaign finance
reforms do not always lessen corruption, but the perception that they make a difference is
important in restoring trust in government. For example, most states have placed limits on
contribution amounts that individuals and interest groups can give. Contributors have often
found loopholes in the law that allows them to circumvent the law, however, the appearance
of corruption would be even greater if contributors were seen giving millions of dollars to
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candidates. Session limits also have the same impact of reducing the appearance of
corruption. Contributors giving contributions just prior to a major legislative vote results in a
heighten level of mistrust among citizens even if the contribution had no impact on the
decision made by the legislator. Session limits, therefore, serve to decrease the perception of
corruption and thus are beneficial to democracy.

1. The Effectiveness of Campaign Finance Reform
As discussed previously, many efforts have attempted to reform the campaign
finance system. Most of the efforts have done little to remove money from the political
system although in some cases they have served to remove the appearance of corruption
from the political system. In this dissertation I have focused on the effectiveness of session
limits in removing the influence of money from politics. These attempts have not been
successful in removing the influence of money from the political system, but have instead
only served to change the strategy employed by interest groups. It appears that contributors,
when faced with session limits, merely shift their contributions to just before the session
begins in the effort to influence legislation during the session.
This leaves the important question of what campaign finance reforms would be the
most effective in removing the undue influence of money from politics. It is obvious from
the research that session limits do not achieve the intended goal of removing the undue
influence of money from politics, therefore one must look elsewhere to answer that question.
Limits on contributions have proven in the past not to be effective, as loopholes, which have
allowed bundling and soft money, have allowed interest groups to get donations to
candidates despite the contribution limit. However, even though session limits may not
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prevent contributors from giving money they may still serve the important purpose of
reducing the appearance of corruption and therefore helping to restore trust of citizens in
government.
Public financing of campaigns is one of the few ways to remove the undue influence
of money from the legislative process. However, public financing is unlikely to remove
completely the influence of money from the election process. While candidates would be
prohibited from receiving any outside money, there is still the possibility that independent
groups would conduct their own media campaigns to elect or defeat a certain candidate. In
order to remove money from elections, it will be necessary to provide public funding in
conjunction with a ban on outside spending. However, even without the ban on independent
expenditures, a movement toward public financing would diminish the influence of money
in the legislative process, since interest groups could not provide money directly to
legislators. The impact of an independent expenditure provided by a PAC during the course
of election is not as likely to be as effective in influencing legislative outcomes as a
contribution given during the legislative session or in close proximity to the legislative
session.
The only other potential alternative to public financing to diminish the influence of
money in politics is to lessen the role of government. If the scope of government is limited,
then the need to influence legislative outcomes is diminished. In highly professional states
with broad political agendas, interest groups appear to be much more active in attempting to
influence legislative outcomes. On the other hand, in less professional states PACs seem to
be targeting the elections more. These findings provide some evidence that one way of
lessening the influence money out of politics is to lessen the scope of government. However,
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this is unlikely to happen any time soon. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the public
will be willing to embrace a system of public financing to remove the influence of money
from politics.

2. Limitations of this Research and the Direction for Future Research
The research presented here examines only a very small slice of the legislation
considered in state legislatures every year. Additional research needs to examine legislation
on a broader array of topics. Furthermore, this research needs to look at the contribution
patterns that surround legislation across other states as well.
The primary focus of this research has been on the actions of contributors and when
they choose to provide campaign contributions to legislators. However, this research is
unable to address the question of how effective those contributions are in changing
legislative votes to the political action committee’s position. From this research we can infer
that interest groups would not be giving contributions if they could not influence legislative
outcomes however, we cannot empirically demonstrate that contributions are successful in
achieving their intended goals.
Future research needs to attempt to identify when and if contributions are successful
in changing a legislator’s vote. A possible approach in attempting to answer this question is
to examine voting patterns of legislators on previous similar issues and to identify those
cases when the legislator votes against his or her expected position. Along with future
research, this dissertation will provide us with a fuller understanding of the role of money in
politics and the direction for future reform efforts.
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Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws
State
Session Limit Individual Limit
on
Contributions
California
No
$20,000
(Governor)
$5,000 (State Wide
Office)
$3000 (Non State Wide
Candidates)

PAC Limit

Small
Contributor
Committees:
$21,200(gube
rnatorial
candidate)
$10,600(other
statewide
candidate)
$6,400(legisla
tive
candidate)
Regular
PACs:
$21,200
(gubernatorial
candidate)
$5,300(other
statewide
candidate)
$3,200(legisla
tive
candidate)
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Corporate
Contribution
Limits
$20,000
(Gubernatoria
l Candidate)
$5,000 (Other
State Wide
Office)
$3,000
(Legislative
candidate)

Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued)
State
Session Limit Individual Limit
on
Contributions
Georgia
Yes
Statewide Candidate:
$5,000(primary or
general election)
$3,000(primary or
general run-off)
Legislative Candidate:
$2,000(primary or
general election)
$1,000(primary or
general run-off)
All amounts per election
cycle.

Illinois
Kentucky

No
No

Unlimited
$1000 Per Candidate Per
Election

New Mexico

Yes

Unlimited
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PAC Limit

$5,000 (State
Wide)
$2,000
(Legislative
Candidate)

Unlimited
$1000 Per
Candidate Per
Election
Unlimited

Corporate
Contribution
Limits
Statewide
Candidates:
$5,000(primar
y or general
election)
$3,000(primar
y or general
run-off)
Legislative
Candidates:
$2,000(primar
y or general
election)
$1,000(primar
y or general
run-off)
All amounts
are per
election cycle.
Unlimited
Prohibited

Unlimited

Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued)
State
Session Limit Individual Limit
on
Contributions
New York
No
Gubernatorial candidates:
Primary –
product of number of
enrolled voters in
candidate's party in the
state x $.005, but not less
than $5,400 or more than
$16,200
General - $33,900
Legislative candidates:
Primary
$5,400(senate candidate)
$3,400(house candidate)
General

PAC Limit

Gubernatorial
candidates:
Primary product of
number of
enrolled
voters in
candidate's
party in the
state x $.005,
but not less
than $5,400 or
more than
$16,200
General $33,900

Corporate
Contribution
Limits
Gubernatorial
candidates:

Primary product of
number of
enrolled
voters in
candidate's
party in the
state x $.005,
but not less
than $5,400 or
more than
$16,200
General $33,900

Legislative
candidates:

$8,500(senate candidate)
$3,400(house candidate)
All amounts are per
calendar year.
Maximum contributions
by an individual cannot
exceed $150,000 in any
one year.

Primary:
$5,400(senate
candidate)
$3,400(house
candidate)

Primary $5,400(senate
candidate)
$3,400(house
candidate)

General:
$8,500(state
senate
candidate)
$3,400(state
house
candidate)
All amounts
are per
calendar year.
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Legislative
candidates:

General $8,500(senate
candidate)
$3,400(house
candidate)
All amounts
are per
calendar year.

Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued)
State
Session Limit Individual Limit
on
Contributions
New York
(Continued)

South
Carolina

Yes (Lobbyist
Only)

$3,500(statewide
candidate)
$1,000(legislative
candidate)
Both amounts are per
election.

Utah
Wisconsin

Yes
Yes (Lobbyist
Only)

Unlimited
$10,000(statewide
candidate)
$1,000(state senate
candidate)
$500(state house
candidate)
All amounts are per
election campaign.
An individual may not
contribute more than
$10,000 in a calendar
year to any combination
of Wisconsin candidates
or political committees.
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PAC Limit

$3,500 (State
Wide)
$1,000
(Legislative
Candidate)
Both amounts
are per
election cycle
Unlimited
$43,128(gube
rnatorial
candidate)
$1,000(state
senate
candidate)
$500(state
house
candidate)

Corporate
Contribution
Limits
Maximum
Political
Contributions
and
expenditures
by a
corporation
cannot exceed
$5,000 in any
one year.
$3,500 (State
Wide)
$1,000
(Legislative
Candidate)

Unlimited
Prohibited

Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued)
State
Session Limit Individual Limit
on
Contributions
Wisconsin
Continued

PAC Limit

Aggregate
limit on
amount
candidates
may accept
from all
committees,
excluding
party
committees,
in an election
campaign:
$485,190(gub
ernatorial
candidate)
$15,525(senat
e candidate)
$7,763(house
candidate)

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures: www.ncsl.org
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Corporate
Contribution
Limits
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